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                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                         NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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                               EASTERN DIVISION
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      IN RE:
                                              MDL 2303
                                              11 C 9308 and
      INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, L.L.C.
 4
                                              related cases
      PATENT LITIGATION.
 5
                                              Chicago, Illinois
                                              September 9, 2013
                                              9:00 o'clock a.m.
 6
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                                   VOLUME 1
                      TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - Trial
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                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES F. HOLDERMAN
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1 Conor Civins on behalf of Hewlett-Packard. 2 THE COURT: Good morning. 3 MR. SHELTON: Good morning, Your Honor. 4 Barry Shelton on behalf of Hewlett-Packard. 5 THE COURT: Good morning. 6 MR. SHELTON: Also in the courtroom is Adam Albright from my firm for Hewlett-Packard, Your Honor. 7 8 MR. ALBRIGHT: Good morning, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. Okay. Well, I appreciate all of the endeavors that 10 11 you have engaged in. The reason I was running a little late is 12 I noticed some things were filed even in the early-morning 13 hours this morning, and I wanted to go through some of those 14 items before we proceed further. 15 I know you spent time on Friday preparing the 16 courtroom, and I appreciate the setup that you have. I 17 appreciate your working with my court reporter for that purpose 18 and my other members of my staff. 19 First of all, let me start out with what you have 20 agreed upon, and that's the stipulation and the proposed order 21 of presentation that's been agreed upon. 22 I agree wholeheartedly. Innovatio is the plaintiff 23 in the case from the standpoint of how we're going to proceed 24 with this matter and has both the benefits and the burdens that 25 come with that position. All right.

MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. McANDREWS: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Now, something that may or may not be -- you have agreed upon. I know you have submitted your joint motion to admit exhibits. I know there are some objections. I appreciate the preciseness with which you have articulated your respective positions. I have not had a chance to review all of the exhibits that you have submitted. They're here arrayed on my bench.

But what I intend to do is to take whatever objections there are with the trial and make determinations after I have an opportunity to review the evidence that's been presented. Okay?

MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. McANDREWS: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel are nodding in affirmance.

I also want to thank you for submitting very efficiently your response to my inquiry for input with regard to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit method of making a determination. That, of course, concept was first generated by now Chief Judge Rader when he was sitting by designation in the District Court in Buffalo in the *Cornell University* case, and it is something that we -- because it's been adopted by the Federal Circuit, continues to be a concept that I need to take

into account. I appreciate your input on that. And as we move through the trial, if you have further positions on that, you certainly can let me know.

All right. Also, with regard to the defendants' motion to exclude two of Innovatio's witnesses, Larry Evans and Christopher Bergey, I am going to take those with the case. You can certainly address those issues as we proceed along so that we can move efficiently. To some extent, the testimony that will be presented will be an offer of proof subject to the objections that the defense will be presenting or have been presenting. Okay?

MR. McANDREWS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. CHERNY: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right? All right. Now, moving on to a series of motions, some of which are now being withdrawn, various motions related to that, and that is the network operator defendants' motions to exclude testimony and evidence related to what they contend to be undisclosed damages contentions.

Let me say this. My thought on that, since I know there may be a disagreement on that point, is to go ahead and, if I can reach some consensus on this, sever that from this proceeding today and move with just the manufacturers' issues.

What's Innovatio's position?

MR. McANDREWS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Holding it for a later time.

MR. McANDREWS: Yeah. I think you'll find in our presentation, starting right off with the opening, that the emphasis today and this week is primarily on the dispute with the manufacturers.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. McANDREWS: If you don't mind, I will footnote the point about the manufacturers and the use-based royalty, but it is literally just that.

THE COURT: You will footnote the point about the network --

MR. McANDREWS: Did I say "manufacturers"?

THE COURT: You did.

MR. McANDREWS: I'm sorry. I misspoke.

THE COURT: You are going to footnote the network defendants.

MR. McANDREWS: The network operator use-based royalty. And when I say "footnote," that is just a very quick point that puts in context the broader dispute with the manufacturers.

THE COURT: Yes. And I understand that. And to the extent that there are disagreements about what was disclosed or what is being disclosed, we are going to put those aside and focus on the issues with regard to the manufacturers and hold for a later time these issues that were raised by Lowe's and

1 Wal-Mart and the other folks that are raising that point. 2 Because I have obviously read the materials that you previously 3 had filed and, consequently, I know your focus is going to be on the manufacturers. 4 5 So is that okay with everybody? Let me hear from the 6 network folks. 7 MR. CHERNY: Yes. 8 THE COURT: Basically, I'm granting your motion from 9 the standpoint -- your motions from the standpoint of severing 10 those issues at this time. 11 Anybody want to comment on that from the network 12 folks? 13 MR. OAKES: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael Oakes 14 for one of the network operators, Lowe's. 15 We're okay with that concept for purposes of this 16 trial today. We do want to preserve our objections to any 17 evidence that would come in with respect to use-based damages 18 for the network operators. 19 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anybody have a 20 disagreement? You don't have to stand up and concur, but if 21 anybody in the courtroom has a disagreement about that, let me 22 know. 23 All right. Silence is affirmance, and we'll go ahead 24 and proceed that way.

With regard to the various housekeeping motions about

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withdrawing motions and correcting motions, I will work that out with my clerk and we'll get an administrative order addressing that.

Okay. We've got just a couple of other housekeeping matters. I see that Ms. Tessar on behalf of her client, who is not a party in this case, desires to file an appearance *pro hac vice*. This is document number 906.

And I assume that the person who has risen from the middle of the audience in the public area is Ms. Tessar.

MS. TESSAR: Yes, Your Honor. My client, Broadcom Corporation, was asked last week to appear as a witness, and so they're here. David Djavaherian, who's in the back, will be testifying this morning.

I put in my application largely because we just want to be sure that Broadcom's confidentiality interests are protected.

THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to that?

MR. McANDREWS: No, Your Honor, not on behalf of plaintiff.

MR. CHERNY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Welcome to the case --

MS. TESSAR: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- for those purposes. Thank you.

All right. I am trying to move efficiently because of my pausing to review some of these materials that were filed

late, which delayed me five minutes getting on the bench, and I want to move through this trial as efficiently as possible because I want to help you folks come to a resolution.

And I want to emphasize again that we are going to proceed with the trial today, tomorrow, Wednesday, Thursday, and then we're going to take a break, and Judge Schenkier has agreed that he is available on Monday for the purpose of assisting you in conducting a real negotiation as opposed to the hypothetical negotiation that I have to evaluate, and perhaps you can work some resolution out, knowing what will have been presented this week.

I am not offended if you deny me the opportunity of issuing an opinion on this point and reach an agreement.

That's perfectly acceptable and, frankly, would be welcomed.

But, otherwise, I'll be ready to go. I am ready to go.

MR. McANDREWS: Thank you.

MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to take up before we proceed with opening statements?

My court reporter had mentioned to me, as we were walking out, that the parties may want to spend a little time explaining what they have arrayed in my courtroom by way of exhibits; but if you do, I am perfectly open to that. If not --

Colleen M. Conway, Official Court Reporter

MR. CHERNY: Maybe later.

1 THE COURT: -- I probably can figure it out as we go 2 along. 3 MR. CHERNY: Steve Cherny on behalf of the defendants. 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. MR. CHERNY: We're happy to certainly do that. 6 not prepared at the moment because no one has told me all the 7 things we brought in. But we do have two brief housekeeping 8 9 matters. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. CHERNY: The first one is that, as you heard from 12 Ms. Tessar, Mr. Djavaherian from Broadcom has graciously 13 appeared to testify here. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. CHERNY: As I think the Court knows, the 16 patents-in-suit were owned by Broadcom previously before they 17 were sold to Innovatio. 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 MR. CHERNY: He has a scheduling issue requiring him 20 to go to Europe, and so the parties have discussed it and, if 21 the Court is amenable, we would like to call him out of order 22 as the first witness after the openings. THE COURT: Okay. 23 24 MR. CHERNY: Mr. McAndrews does not have any issue with that. So it's in your court. 25

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                THE COURT: All right. Let me make sure I've got the
 2
      spelling of his name for the benefit of my court reporter who
 3
      has prepared a glossary for herself, since she's providing
      realtime.
 4
                And so, Ms. Tessar, your client's name is spelled
 5
      how?
 6
 7
                MS. TESSAR:
                             There is a silent D at the beginning,
      D-j-a-v-a-h-e-r-i-a-n, Dave Djavaherian.
 8
 9
                THE COURT: Djavaherian?
10
                MS. TESSAR: Yes.
11
                THE COURT:
                            David?
12
                MS. TESSAR: Yes.
13
                MR. CHERNY: Yes.
14
                THE COURT: All right. Any objection to calling him
15
      so he can go to Europe?
16
                MR. McANDREWS: No, there is not, Your Honor, no.
17
                THE COURT: Okay. All right. It's beautiful in
18
      Europe this time of year. Okay.
19
                MR. CHERNY: One other --
20
                THE COURT: Anything else?
21
                MR. CHERNY: One other issue is that --
22
                THE COURT:
                            Sure.
23
                MR. CHERNY: -- during a short part of my opening,
24
      there will be some third-party confidential information,
25
      actually specifically Broadcom information --
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. CHERNY: -- and then there is going to be 3 Mr. Djavaherian's testimony. After talking to Ms. Tessar and Mr. Djavaherian, I think that as long as people in the court 4 5 are either counsel or in-house counsel and agree to be bound by 6 the protective order, they have no issue. 7 But to the extent there are people outside this case 8 -- and I note that we have an array of people from --9 THE COURT: We have a pretty full courtroom, yes, we 10 do. 11 I actually went through and asked MR. CHERNY: 12 everybody who they are, and almost all of the people are 13 related to the case. It's just the case is very large, and the 14 only people --15 THE COURT: Sure. 16 MR. CHERNY: -- I have been able to identify who are 17 not lawyers or related to the parties are a contingent from 18 John Marshall Law School in the background. 19 So it may be that specifically when we get to 20 Mr. Djavaherian's testimony, we may need to ask them to leave, 21 because --22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. CHERNY: -- apparently, there is very highly 24 confidential information of Broadcom's that will be elicited. 25 THE COURT: All right. Well, let me just ask, is

Professor Arthur Yuan here?

Yes. Good morning, Professor.

PROFESSOR YUAN: Yes. Good morning, Judge.

THE COURT: You and I, of course, have known one another for years. We've talked together. We've worked in China together. And you called my chambers last week and asked is there a particular day or time that would be better than any other day or time to come in to allow the folks that are here from China, from the John Marshall Law School to come in and visit, and I said to my secretary, whom I assume conveyed to you, no, there really isn't any one time that I could predict that would be better than any other.

So I am pleased that you chose this morning. The difficulty, as you may have heard -- I know you are back in the public area, Professor. The difficulty is that some of the information is confidential.

PROFESSOR YUAN: Right.

THE COURT: And perhaps by the time we get to that confidential information, your folks will have seen enough anyway to have an understanding of the proceedings that are taking place.

So let me just ask Mr. Cherny, how soon in your opening remarks do you think you will get --

MR. CHERNY: I think the opening is not going to be a big issue. I have actually moved two or three slides that

address it to the end, and so I will be able to signal at the end. So they will be able to see, I believe, almost all of the openings, Mr. McAndrews' and mine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHERNY: And I think probably the part with most sensitivity will be Mr. Djavaherian's testimony, which I'm told is relatively short.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHERNY: So it may just be a matter of asking the contingent from John Marshall to leave. I mean, as interesting as Mr. Djavaherian's testimony, I'm sure, would be to them, perhaps that might be the one part of the day they won't be able to watch.

THE COURT: All right. Professor, you understand? PROFESSOR YUAN: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And you can convey our apologies to the folks that are with you. But we'll have to ask you and your folks to step out during that period of time. You're certainly welcome to come back.

PROFESSOR YUAN: Sure.

THE COURT: And let me just say to those folks, this happens not too often, but certainly happens in these types of cases where we have to exclude people from the courtroom pursuant to a protective order. And so, consequently, some people need to step out.

	18
1	So I will leave it up to you to assist us in that. I
2	have known you long enough.
3	PROFESSOR YUAN: All right.
4	THE COURT: Professor Yuan is a member of the bar
5	MR. CHERNY: Yes.
6	THE COURT: and recently a citizen of the United
7	States, sworn in this courtroom
8	MR. CHERNY: Congratulations.
9	PROFESSOR YUAN: Thank you.
10	THE COURT: and I have known him for many years.
11	He was a practicing attorney before he became a professor.
12	MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor. We appreciate
13	your diligence here.
14	THE COURT: All right. Let me also ask, because I
15	see some other friendly faces out there as well, how about
16	witnesses? Are we going to exclude witnesses or not?
17	MR. McANDREWS: No.
18	MR. CHERNY: We don't have any intention to invoke
19	the rule.
20	MR. McANDREWS: Nor Innovatio, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: All right. Then Rule 615 of the Federal
22	Rules of Evidence will not apply in these proceedings, and
23	we'll proceed accordingly.
24	MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

1 MR. McANDREWS: And then a final point. We have just 2 a couple of Cisco confidential schematics --3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. McANDREWS: -- that we're going to briefly touch 5 on in the opening. My understanding is with the technical 6 setup here, we can blank out the Jumbotron, the gallery screen, 7 and the others. So those exhibits are just published to counsel and Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Did I get that right, Mr. Thies? 10 MR. McANDREWS: 11 THE COURT: All right. Well, excellent. I am glad 12 that technology allows you to do that. And I know that we are 13 all hard-wired here. 14 MR. McANDREWS: Yes. 15 THE COURT: There's no wireless going on. My court 16 reporter made sure --17 (Laughter.) 18 MR. CHERNY: There will be no request for royalties 19 from Innovatio for the Court. 20 THE COURT: Right. I understand. 21 MR. McANDREWS: So stipulated. 22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. And just so a 23 reviewing court would not get the wrong impression, what 24 Mr. McAndrews referred to as a Jumbotron is a projection screen 25 that actually isn't as large as some projection screens that

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1
      have been in this courtroom. But last night when the Cowboys
      were playing the Giants in Dallas, that's a Jumbotron.
 2
 3
                MR. McANDREWS: That's a Jumbotron.
                THE COURT: That's 60 yards wide. So --
 4
 5
                MR. CHERNY: Perhaps the next hearing, we could
 6
      convene in a Texas courtroom.
                            If you want to, but we'll talk about it.
 7
                THE COURT:
 8
                MR. CHERNY: Okay, Your Honor.
 9
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
10
                MR. McANDREWS: And the larger screen, Your Honor,
11
      was jointly at the request of counsel and the parties, and we
12
      appreciate the accommodation.
13
                THE COURT: Yes. And I fully understand.
                                                           When we
      had the earlier proceeding, it was difficult because we hadn't
14
15
      considered the audience. And I appreciate your setting up the
16
      flat screen over here to the left of the bench to assist me,
17
      and the projection screen over to the right of the bench
18
      hopefully will assist members of the public --
19
                MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.
20
                THE COURT: -- and others sitting in the public area.
21
                All right. Anything else?
22
                MR. CHERNY: Not from our side, Your Honor.
23
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
24
                MR. McANDREWS: Not from Innovatio, Your Honor.
25
                THE COURT: All right. We'll give the signal when we
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have to. We'll just pause and talk about exclusion when we have to. But we're ready to proceed with the folks from China, from John Marshall, as well as everyone else who has gathered here this morning in the courtroom.

Mr. McAndrews, the floor is yours.

MR. McANDREWS: Thank you, Your Honor.

As an initial matter -- I know I speak on behalf of Mr. Whitley, Innovatio, and the entire Innovatio legal team -- and I'm sure that I speak on behalf of my colleagues on the defense team as well -- when I thank Your Honor for all the time and energy that you and your staff have put in to this, the complicated issues in this case.

MR. CHERNY: And in this regard, Mr. McAndrews does, indeed, speak for all of us.

THE COURT: Well, I just want to comment, that I have commented many times to my staff and to others, what an excellent job you lawyers are doing. And I know you're fighting hard and, yet, you were able to resolve issues that should be resolved so we can get right to the key points, and that's why I am endeavoring hard to get a resolution to you and for you and to assist you in that endeavor. But it is certainly a pleasure to sit in this courtroom in this case with --

MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- the outstanding lawyers that I have

McAndrews - opening

before me. So thank you.

MR. McANDREWS: We appreciate that, Your Honor. We have tight disputes.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McANDREWS: A few areas of agreement. I would add -- and I think my colleagues know this -- it has also been a pleasure working with the defense team on this. These are complex issues. We have issues of first impression at bar, and we have been, by and large, very pleased to work with them.

THE COURT: Yeah, you folks are a model, I have to say. I have other cases that aren't quite as good in that area.

All right. Let's get to the issue at hand.

MR. McANDREWS: Yes. Get down to business.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF INNOVATIO

MR. McANDREWS: So how much value do we assign the creative genius of Ron Mahany and his colleagues from Cedar Rapids, Iowa? What's his technical legacy worth with respect to 802.11 technology, the Wi-Fi market, and specifically the patents-in-suit?

That's what we're here to decide this week. That's the subject of these very, very important RAND proceedings.

Now, as Your Honor recently pointed out at one of our status hearings, the issues in this case and how Your Honor comes down on those issues is not only important to Noel

McAndrews - opening

Whitley and to Innovatio, but it's important to the future of science technology -- science and technology in the United States as well, and it certainly has given the issues at bar.

Now, in many instances, Your Honor, under the patent law, we're told that we have to disregard the statements and commentary from inventors, such as Mr. Mahany. I see Mr. Thies is nodding his head. A couple of examples might be claim construction, what's the value of the invention, what's the scope of the invention, damages issues, just by way of example.

In this case, though, something that Mr. Mahany said back in 1997 is critically relevant to the issues that are now at bar. Let's take a look.

In June of 1997, on behalf of his company, Norand, Mr. Mahany submitted a Letter of Assurance to the IEEE with respect to the then-emerging technology of Norand directed to the 802.11 products as in technologies.

Importantly, Mr. Mahany's assurance guaranteed that Norand would make licenses available "on reasonable terms and conditions." Reasonable terms and conditions.

Now, I suspect that his choice of the term "reasonable" was not coincidental. It harmonizes quite perfectly with §284 of the Patent Act, which, of course, provides that an inventor or a patentholder in the event of infringement is entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty for infringement.

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It also squares up very nicely with the IEEE bylaws. In here, we're referring specifically to Plaintiff's Exhibit 633, and this is Section 6.2(b) of the IEEE Standards Board Bylaws. And, again, this section of the bylaws provide that in a Letter of Assurance, the granter or the submitter has to make licenses for compliant implementations available "under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms and conditions."

So what do we see here? We see in the Letter of Assurance from Mr. Mahany, we see in §284 of the Patent Act, and then, again, we see in the bylaws the term "reasonable." We don't see anything about nominal cost, we don't see anything about pennies or fractions of a penny per unit, and we certainly don't see anything that says that RAND in the context of essentiality means low.

And, yet, what we're going to see here is an emerging theme in this case, one of the prevailing themes, to be sure. The defendants' position is that RAND means low and RAND means insignificant.

The evidence is going to show -- and you'll hear it through the testimony of Dr. Teece on behalf of Innovatio and others -- that RAND, instead, means reasonable and it has to mean reasonable.

Now, on the issue of nominal cost, I examined the defendants' expert, Dr. Shoemake, on the very point. And you'll see in his report he confirmed that his interpretation

McAndrews - opening

of RAND is that it requires licensing at nominal cost. He even says in his view, nominal cost is consistent with RAND obligations.

During his deposition, I probed a little bit further. I wanted to understand exactly what his interpretation of nominal cost was, and he told me he believes it means "small or low cost," and he even used the term "insignificant," or he agreed with me when I did. Insignificant, low, small. RAND means low.

And then the final bit of his testimony, again, I asked whether or not the concept of RAND being low was a guiding principle for Dr. Shoemake for the purposes of him forming his opinions in this case. He confirmed that it was.

Now, putting aside for the moment that this is altogether inconsistent with the purpose -- or the dual purposes of RAND, on the issue of nominal cost, Dr. Shoemake's testimony and his opinion don't square with the IEEE requirements themselves.

What do I mean by that? If we take a look at two versions of the IEEE Operations Manual. The first is the 1995 version -- and for the record, this is Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 642 -- we see that that version specifically referred to nominal competitive costs. However, by the time we arrive at the 1997 version of the same section of the Operations Manual -- and this is 6.3.2, the Submittal section dealing with

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Letters of Assurance and the guarantees that the submitters make -- the 1997 manual, by the way, for the record, is Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 673 -- the IEEE shows decidedly different language by the time we got to this point. And what was the language they chose? "Reasonable rates, terms, and conditions." Again, back in harmony with the Letter of Assurance Mr. Mahany submitted back in June of 1997, in harmony with §284 of the Patent Act, and sitting quite squarely -- in fact, I think using verbatim language -- right out of the IEEE bylaws.

So we've talked about the general and prevailing theme that defendants have taken the position that RAND must mean, it must command an insignificant or low royalty rate, but let's put that in context. Let's take a look right now at exactly how low the defendants think the rate ought to be.

In this case, defendants' expert, Dr. Lynde, has opined that Innovatio is entitled to a royalty in the range of 6/100ths of a cent -- and I have to struggle with that for a little while with the decimal places and the cent versus the dollar sign. That is 6/100ths of a cent all the way to 4.16 cents at the high end.

Fair? Not even close. Reasonable? No way. Does it comply with RAND? No. That is all attorney argument, though. So let's put it in context.

The evidence will show -- and this is just an

McAndrews - opening

exemplary example, Your Honor.

There is some confidential information. As I understand it, in talking to counsel, this is publicly available in the 10 case.

We see Cisco's sales topping approximately \$10.5 billion with estimated profits of just north of \$7.5 billion.

Embracing just the low end of Dr. Lynde's proposed royalty rate here would net Mr. Whitley and Innovatio a royalty of \$71,000, just a hair over \$71,000. So what we're talking about is a royalty rate at the low end that wouldn't even cover the cost of prosecuting just a handful of these rather complex patents.

And that puts aside, Your Honor, the issue of the tens of millions of dollars that companies like Norand and Cisco and Broadcom dump into research and development to develop these essential technologies in the first place.

I mentioned earlier the dual purposes of RAND, and Dr. David Teece from the University of Cal, Berkeley will testify later this morning on this point. Obviously, one of the purposes is to make standard-essential technology available to implementers. And we have to do that, as we've already seen, in the continuity of the documentary record all the way back, dating back to the June 20th Letter of Assurance, the 1997 Letter of Assurance. The licenses have to be made available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

McAndrews - opening

But also -- and Dr. Teece is going to focus on the absence of this recognition throughout the defendants' case and their expert reports -- you've also got to provide adequate compensation or motivation for inventors like Ron Mahany to contribute to the standards-setting process. And I would submit, and I think the evidence is going to show, that a royalty rate of \$71,000 on the low end or even the high end, numbering in the very, very low single million dollars, isn't the type of motivation that's sufficient to meet this purpose of RAND, Your Honor.

Now, without adequate compensation, there are few obvious consequences. First of all, patentholders of standard-essential technology may simply opt out of the process in the first place. Alternatively, they may withhold their technology from the marketplace altogether, irrespective of the standards-setting process. And in that case, and in either event, the standards simply aren't going to include the best available technology, and we don't want that. We want to foster creativity, creative genius, ingenuity, all that go into strong and robust standards. At the same time, we want to reward the inventors for their incredible contributions to that standard.

Let's turn to the purpose of 802.11 itself. And, of course, this comes from the IEEE 2007 version of the standard. For the record, this is Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1.

McAndrews - opening

In here, in sum and substance, of course, and it's not surprising, we're focusing on wireless connectivity, technology that goes to the core of the mobile computing and mobile communication world that we live in today, that we rely on, and that is not only essential as a term of art, but is critical to our day-to-day business and lives.

One of the things that we focus on as well in the stated purpose of the standard is the concept of use of this technology, specifically with portable or handheld devices.

I recall one of the hearings, Your Honor talked about your granddaughter needing the data, I think on the iPad or another tablet-type device -- and, of course, the data, I suspect, that your granddaughter needs to access is content that doesn't inherently reside just on that tablet. Instead, she accesses it somewhere else. And I would venture a guess that the iPad she has is not tethered to anything. It's all wireless connectivity.

Now, what we're here to talk about isn't Wi-Fi in general, but the importance of the claim technologies of Innovatio's asserted patents to the Wi-Fi market.

And Your Honor may recall that during the essentiality phase, at the broadest level, we broke the Innovatio technologies down into four categories.

We're going to hear testimony from Dr. Ray Nettleton. Your Honor recalls and is familiar with Dr. Nettleton. He

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testified during the essentiality phase. We will hear testimony as well from Mr. Chris Bergey, a former Broadcom marketing executive and an electrical engineer concerning these.

But just by way of high-level review, we've got the channel-sharing family, the multi-transceiver/multi-channel, the sleep family, and then, finally, the mesh family.

And a high-level description again, we will let the experts get into a lower level of the weeds on this, but the channel-sharing basically avoids collisions between messages.

One of the things that Dr. Nettleton will talk about is the hidden node problem, and I think that was addressed briefly at the essentiality proceeding with some nice schematics.

The multi-transceiver/multi-channel, the way that my EE colleagues have explained this to me is let's just think about all the access points on the market these days that are dual band or dual radio. It allows operation, the 2.4 gigahertz and 5 gigahertz bands. It makes it backwards-compatible so you can talk on -- the access point can communicate with devices on the newer bg channel as well as the legacy devices in the 802.11a band. I'm sorry, in the 2.4 gigahertz band.

One of the other possibilities with this technology, and one of the values received, is that you can increase

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significantly the bandwidth of the access point.

The "sleep" family we talked about a good deal during the essentiality proceeding.

This family of technologies was important to Ron Mahany and his team at Norand because they implemented this in wireless barcode systems and inventory management. Those are battery-operated devices. And in the field, battery charge/length of use is critical. This technology allows mobile devices to remain mobile for a much longer period of time.

And then, finally, the mesh networking that allows for wireless infrastructure, in applications, perhaps, where a wired backbone or Ethernet cable is impractical or inefficient, and that's becoming more popular. Dr. Nettleton is going to talk about that.

Let's turn to the accused products, which is one of the main issues, one of the things that gives value to the Innovatio asserted claims here.

Broadly, the accused products break down, of course, into two categories, the network devices and the terminal devices on the other hand.

Within the network device category, we've got the popular access points. One of the points that I would make about the access point is that but-for its Wi-Fi functionality, an access point is nothing. Without Wi-Fi, an access point is

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a coaster or a paper weight.

Similarly with wireless radio modules. These are aftermarket devices that you might plug into an existing piece of equipment.

Ms. Conway, if I'm going too fast, just queue me.

You might plug into an existing piece of equipment, such as a wired router, to make it comply with your wireless LAN.

And then, of course, we've got hybrid products, such as some of those offered by Defendant SonicWALL where you actually combine the functionality of another network device. In the case of SonicWALL, a good example is a firewall with a Wi-Fi access point.

One of the points I would make about this, and you will see this a little later on in the economic analysis, is that it gives us a very nice comparison or data point. In the case of SonicWALL especially, they offer versions of their firewalls that are not wireless and they offer other versions that do have wireless functionality. And that gives us a nice price delta for the purposes of comparison in determining a rate, something that Larry Evans will testify to later on.

Turning to terminal devices, there are many more representative products in this set. I will go through them just quickly. A wireless dongle simply turns other devices into a wireless-compliant device. Wi-Fi printers. Again,

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another good example, Defendant HP makes many, many models of printers that have a wireless version and a non-wireless version. It gives us a nice comparison for the purpose of establishing a proxy or a value, the delta there for the purposes of determining the royalty in the case.

Laptops today, you virtually can't buy a laptop on the market that doesn't have Wi-Fi capability, and, yet, you will see we're not assigning 100% importance to the Wi-Fi in the laptops.

Tablets. We talked a little bit about the example, of the importance of Wi-Fi connectivity to the tablet. And I think the same is true with respect to laptops -- or tablets as it is with laptops. Virtually no tablets are sold on the market without connectivity.

Inventory and tracking, much of this equipment on the market is a follow-on to the early technology created by Norand back in Cedar Rapids in the mid-1990s.

And then, finally, we've got miscellaneous terminals.

A simple example of this might be a wireless security camera.

And we're seeing more and more of those in the marketplace.

Now, let's briefly introduce Innovatio's experts. I have mentioned, I think, virtually all of their names so far.

Dr. David Teece is going to be testifying on economic and RAND policy issues. Dr. Ray Nettleton the Court is familiar with. He will be touching on the 802.11 technology,

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the accused technologies, and certain of the standards issues.

Chris Bergey is a nine-year veteran of Broadcom. He no longer works there. As I mentioned earlier, he's an electrical engineer and worked as a marketing executive at Broadcom, interfacing on a day-to-day basis with Broadcom's customers concerning the very features, values, and benefits that are at issue in this case right now, and he's going to provide some very insightful testimony concerning that value.

Rick Bero will testify on the accounting issues. Mr. Bero is going to crunch the numbers for us. And then, finally, Larry Evans will provide Innovatio's opinion concerning an appropriate RAND rate in this case.

So where does the rubber hit the road here? Let's get to the amount.

Here is Innovatio's proposed RAND rate. Innovatio took a two-step process here. First, it took a look at the value of its four core technologies to Wi-Fi as a whole, and it came up, as you'll hear testimony from Mr. Bergey and Mr. Evans, came up with a 6% rate.

Then Innovatio didn't stop there. Innovatio then applied that 6% rate and apportioned it according to the relative importance of 802 functionality to a particular Wi-Fi device. And we can look at some examples here.

On the -- in the left-hand column in green, you will see the feature factor that Mr. Bergey determined. And, again,

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when I say "feature factor" here, we're talking about the importance of Wi-Fi to that particular product set. Access points, of course, are nothing without it, so it's a very high feature factor.

In the right-hand column, you will see Mr. Evans' calculation of the appropriate royalty rate based on Mr. Bergey's feature factor input.

Very similar for wireless modules. The multi-function router and firewall, SonicWALL is a really good example of this. You will see a much lower feature factor. Why is that? Because wireless in those products is in everything. You can get a non-wireless version of one of the SonicWALL firewalls.

And now the feature factor and applicable resulting RAND rates for other terminal devices. Again, I would point out, and I'm just repeating here, when it comes to printers, Wi-Fi is important to a wireless printer, but it is not a be-all/end-all feature.

One of the nice data points that Mr. Evans calculated with respect to some of the accused HP printers is a \$50 average price delta between a wired and a wireless version. Or I guess, more appropriately, I would say a non-wireless and a wireless version of the same product. They offer hundreds of products that have the dual functionality.

And then with respect to laptops, Mr. Evans also

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picked up on a few other data points. One of them was using the average sale price of a dongle, and he also considered an amount that comes out as about twice the average delta of the printers. The feature factor, of course, as I mentioned earlier, on laptops is much lower. It's just the 10%. And you can see it has a corresponding dramatic effect on the proposed RAND rate.

And we just finish out the list. I won't go through this in exhaustive detail. But the point here is that you will see with different product sets within the terminal device family, you are going to have widely variant and disparate feature factors applied and, therefore, resulting royalty rates. Mr. Bergey and Mr. Evans will elaborate on those points, Your Honor.

Here's the footnote that we're getting to, and I think to the point perhaps that Your Honor was making. We've got a couple of conditional red bullet points that I wanted to emphasize.

There's been a lot of talk about Innovatio's proposed use-based royalty or per location royalty. That's conditional, and it's conditioned on the assumption that there would not be patent exhaustion with respect to the manufacturer defendants.

It is also conditioned on something that I have discussed with my colleagues, and that is that there would not be a payment by the manufacturer defendants for the network

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operators' past infringement; that is, sales of accused products that date back or reach back into the past.

And I don't think I need to discuss the per location amount. We're going to defer that to a later time. I also think that's pretty well covered in the briefing, Your Honor.

Now, one of the things that Mr. Evans did, of course, in considering an appropriate RAND rate is he benchmarked. He went out into the marketplace and he looked -- he took a look at comparable licenses.

There are a number of them here. I think we list five. This is just an exemplary list.

A few of the points that I would make here.



MR. CHERNY: I just want to note, Mr. McAndrews did not -- these are our confidential documents, and they were not identified that we were going to be addressing this on this -- if you will blank that, I would appreciate it.

MR. McANDREWS: I sure will. I sure will. I am sorry about that.

THE COURT: Let's move that from the public display to the more *in camera* display that is available to counsel.

MR. McANDREWS: And that makes sense. And that was

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on the defense team are so focused on? A couple of reasons.

Numerous of the asserted claims in the patents-in-suit are directed, specifically directed to systems or apparatuses that go far beyond the structure and function of a Wi-Fi chip.

I would make the same point in a more broad -- or in a broader sense with respect to some of the system claims. You've got certain claims that would incorporate, in terms of accused technology, one or more access points with a plurality of different terminal devices. Certainly in that context, as in the first, it doesn't make any sense at all to jump down to a single component of any one of those products when you're looking at an appropriate royalty base.


As Your Honor mentioned in your opening comments this morning, we get guidance from Chief Judge Rader in the LaserDynamics case, and he introduces the concept of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit.

Now, here are the slides where I will move through mercifully quick. These are -- I don't think the -- the initial one doesn't include a schematic, but this is illustrative of the point, Your Honor.

If I could step over, please?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. McANDREWS: In this instance, by my count, there are at least seven discrete structural elements in the claim,



7 8

Let me go back on with this. I talk about system claims. And, very briefly, here's an example of a combination or system claim where you're talking about, right off the bat here in the second element, one or more base stations communicating with plurality of roaming terminals. And, yet, under defendants' interpretation of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, we are jumping down just to the level of the MAC Wi-Fi chip, disregarding all of the other claimed

Now, defendants' commentary on the smallest salable patent-practicing unit is informative here. Each of the experts distance themselves from the specific definition provided by Chief Judge Rader in *LaserDynamics*.

structural and functional elements of the asserted claim.

In the case of Dr. Lynde, he seizes on the smallest salable unit tied to the 802.11 WLAN technology. He doesn't say anything there about an element-by-element analysis. And it would seem, from the name of the term itself, smallest salable patent-practicing, when we hear "patent-practicing," you got to remember that that requires an element-by-element consideration, certainly at the highest level.

Dr. Leonard similarly focuses on the "smallest salable unit with a close relation to the patented features;" not with a close relation to an element-by-element analysis,

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just a close relation to the patented features.

Now, Dr. Shoemake has offered the opinion that the IEEE working group would have rejected any proposal for a license offered on a per product basis. His opinion in that regard, though, is directly contradicted by the IEEE's own documentation.

And in this case, we're looking at Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 357. This is the form Letter of Assurance that's provided by the IEEE to submitters. And in the first case, we're focusing on the grant clause, again, provides for "reasonable terms and conditions." We don't see anything about the old 1995 nominal cost language. And, importantly, under the grant provision, it gives the submitter the option to grant a license or spell out a license as a percent "of product price, flat fee, or per unit." Percent of product price. It doesn't say anything about percent of chip price. It doesn't speak of percent of component price. And in this regard, this language is very, very consistent with the comparable licenses that Mr. Evans considered, all of which were granted on a per product basis, not a per chip, not a per component basis.

Now, we'll hear testimony from Dr. Teece concerning the exemplary distribution chain. This is self-evident, I think, to the Court; that you've got the Wi-Fi chip manufacturer on the far end of the chain, then the terminal device or access point manufacturers, retailers or, in many

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cases, of course, wholesalers when we're talking about industrial implementations of this or enterprise-level implementations, and then the end users, the companies that actually implement Wi-Fi or even offer it to the public, as is the case with many hotels, coffee shops, and whatnot.

There is a corresponding value chain, of course, that follows or sits on top of the distribution chain. And in this case, simply you've got Cisco, or any of the other manufacturers at one level of the value chain, selling you an access point for an average sale price. In the interim, you've got businesses such as FedEx that rely heavily on the technology and their global logistics and shipping operations. And then, again, the higher end of the example is where you've got certain customers actually utilizing this to generate revenue, to bring in more -- to sell more sandwiches or coffee, or making things convenient for hotel patrons.

A few of the next examples, again, these focus on value to the network operator. We're not talking right now -- we've deferred our discussion of the appropriate rate with respect to them. But the value to network operators, as Dr. Teece will testify, still ought to be very relevant to the inquiry concerning an appropriate rate with respect to the manufacturer defendants.

This is just a simple example that I don't need to go through, but it illustrates the point that network operators

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derive great benefit and frequently revenue itself off of their use of the infringing technologies.

Now, one of the suggestions or at least the overtones of the defendants' argument seems to be that Innovatio had an obligation to bring in or to sue or to approach chip manufacturers for license. That's not the case for a number of reasons. It's an issue that Judge Davis actually specifically addressed -- Judge Davis did address it, and I will get to that slide. Here we go.

Judge Davis, of course, simply said that as the master of its case, the plaintiff decides who it sues. There's no legal requirement that it sue everyone in the distribution chain.

And I would point out in the context of this case, in particular, Your Honor, Innovatio, in the first instance, didn't sue the manufacturer defendants. The manufacturer defendants brought suits for declaratory judgment. And obviously it goes without saying there isn't a chip manufacturer in suit. We're going to hear the testimony from Mr. Djavaherian from Broadcom, but they simply aren't in suit. They haven't DJ'd Innovatio. Innovatio, for its part, hasn't sued a chip manufacturer.

There's discussion concerning the concept of holdup in the briefing and the dialogue between the parties.

Dr. Teece is going to testify concerning an equally important

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consideration and problem, and that, of course, is that of reverse holdup.

The ITC recently picked up on this issue in one of their opinions concerning *Apple* -- the *Apple* and *Samsung* dispute. They simply define it as circumstances where an implementer of essential technology uses the technology without compensating the patent owner. And then although it's not highlighted, it goes on to point out that it's frequently done under the guise that the patent owner's offers to license weren't fair, they weren't reasonable, they didn't comply with RAND.

Now, in this case -- do you see any problem here, counsel? I don't think any of this is --

THE COURT: Are you talking about slide 46?

MR. McANDREWS: This is slide 46 --

MR. CHERNY: No, Your Honor.

MR. McANDREWS: -- Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Cherny.

MR. McANDREWS: In this instance, Your Honor -- and we've got four of the representative manufacturer defendants -- they widely advertise, and it's no secret that they practice the compliant technology. And, of course, one of the disputed issues in this case is whether or not that's covered by Innovatio's hundreds of standard-essential claims. We, of course, contend that it is. So there's no question that

they're practicing the compliant standard here. They make that clear.

Now, none of the manufacturer defendants in this case has applied for a RAND license. And we see language, it's a re-occurring theme in the IEEE literature and the RAND commentary, and that is submitters will make licenses available to all applicants.

The second point, none of the manufacturers, with the exception of one, has countered Innovatio's opening offer. And I think we've discussed this in court before. Innovatio has made an opening RAND offer. It sent out the signal. We're waiting back for an echo. We've gotten one, one from our friends at SonicWALL.

And then the final point that I would make -- and perhaps things will change come this next Monday. But none of the manufacturers have called up Innovatio, sat down and engaged in legitimate negotiations or meaningful negotiations concerning working out a RAND rate on a bilateral basis. And I know I made that point almost 18 months ago at the time, and I think my colleague said, "Well, of course Cisco is willing to sit down." Perhaps Monday we get our opportunity to do just that.

Now, patent pools are one of the subjects that are discussed and will be discussed by the defendants' experts in this case. Dr. Teece is going to provide testimony concerning

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the reasons that patent pool rates are informative in connection with the RAND analysis here.

Similarly, we hear about the issue of royalty stacking. In this case, there is no evidence of a royalty stack that creates a problem.

Now, each of the defendants' experts has admitted as much. Both Dr. Leonard and Dr. Lynde, during their depositions, confirmed that they have not calculated a royalty stack in connection with the facts of this case.

Now, having not done that, that would seem to render their opinions in this regard theoretical. In theory, of course, is something that Judge Davis also picked up on in the recent *Ericsson* case, Your Honor. And what he said, very briefly: "The best word to describe Defendants' royalty stacking argument is theoretical." So, too, in this case. The concept of there being a problem concerning a royalty stack is purely theoretical. It is not supported by any evidence of record.

Now, Dr. Nettleton will provide testimony concerning the unavailability of non-infringing alternatives, and that is an issue that, to some degree, was covered during the essentiality hearing. We're going to hear a more robust discussion between the parties on that here.

So the bottom line here, Your Honor, is that RAND means reasonable. It doesn't mean pennies per unit. It

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doesn't mean a license on a per chip basis. It certainly doesn't mean low.

Nothing about the defendants' proposed royalty range is fair or reasonable. Fractions of a penny up to 4 cents -- I can't even say 4 cents and change. 4 cents and a fraction on the high end.

Innovatio's families of technology are critical and they are valuable to Wi-Fi. The defendants, of course, have universally implemented these technologies, smallest salable unit here. We're talking about products, not chips. And to comply with the purposes of RAND and the requirement of the Patent Act, any royalty must be dollars and not cents in this case.

Does Your Honor have any questions?

THE COURT: Not at this point. I appreciate the fine presentation.

MR. McANDREWS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We will turn it over to Mr. Cherny.

MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor. And I have another notebook.

THE COURT: All right. I think what we'll do, if it's okay with everybody, we will take a break after Mr. Cherny's remarks. In fact, I think we should do that before we proceed with any further -- or any testimony.

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Wi-Fi symbol that we're all familiar with. Norand did not invent Wi-Fi. Innovatio's patents did not invent Wi-Fi. It is for that reason alone that apportionment is key here.

Throughout Mr. McAndrews' presentation, we heard about the value of Wi-Fi. There is nobody in this court who's ever going to say that Wi-Fi isn't wonderful. But that's not the inquiry here. And what you heard precious little about -- in fact, I don't think anyone heard anything about -- was the value of the patented features to Wi-Fi and specifically to the standard that all these claims are essential to.

You saw a slide such as this. We have a picture of a Marriott. Now, we heard about how valuable Wi-Fi is to the Marriott. That is wholly irrelevant. What we have to focus on here in a rigorous fashion and not at a very high level, 30,000-foot fashion is the value of the patented features at issue in these patents which form a very, very small part of the mosaic of claims and patents that are essential to 802.11. And without doing that, we are inviting ourselves error.

This has become a key part, as the Court has seen, in the cases, such as *LaserDynamics*, by the way, which was Judge Rader, not Chief Judge Rader. Chief Judge Rader, as you noted, spoke sitting by designation, sitting in your chair, so to speak. Although, I think when he was doing it --

Colleen M. Conway, Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: But in Buffalo.

MR. CHERNY: Well, in Buffalo. And I think, although

sitting by designation, feeling as he was speaking on behalf of a larger audience.

So it's not about Wi-Fi. It is not about the value of Wi-Fi to Marriott. It is about the value of the patented features. And you are being invited in an attempt to broaden out the value of these very, very narrow, focused patents to give Innovatio a percentage of the value of Wi-Fi. And if there's anything that the cases show, that is error.

You saw a slide that Mr. McAndrews put up that Cisco makes \$10 billion. And I guess the implication is that Cisco makes a lot of money selling products. And, therefore, if we value the patented features accurately and somehow we don't give a large amount of that to Innovatio, somehow something is wrong.

Again, this is the reason why we apportion. Cisco sells many products with many thousands of technologies that encompass many, many standards, and, therefore, it is wholly irrelevant that Cisco on the whole is a very successful company. Innovatio doesn't, by virtue of that fact, get a percentage of that. It gets the value of the patented features in the context of RAND.

And that takes me to my next slide and then I will get to go, hopefully, on to my presentation and stop trying to put Mr. McAndrews' presentation up on the ELMO.

Mr. McAndrews very clearly is trying to relate this

case to the normal case of reasonable royalty. It is not. The reason we are here -- and now please switch to my presentations, Will.

And I'd like to introduce to the Court -- I think you have seen him before -- Mr. Will Thomas in the back who is intimately more important than I am about making this happen.

THE COURT: Well, we appreciate the flawless way he has handled these matters. So thank you.

MR. CHERNY: As do I.

Here is the title of our presentation. I was some impression RAND is different. Mr. McAndrews spent very little time -- I don't even know if he mentioned the word standards or the goals of standards or the problems in standards, but he did at a certain time tried to liken this to the regular, old reasonable royalty negotiation that we're all familiar with. But that is not why we're here, and that's not why this Court has convened this special hearing, nor why Judge Robart convened his hearing in Washington, because there is a recognition now that standards are different, RAND is different.

So just because both have the word "reasonable" in their work doesn't mean that we use the same analysis. And so, what I'd like to do is spend a little time, unlike Mr. McAndrews, talking about the goals of standards and some of the problems and some of what RAND was meant to address,

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because we are dealing with a very carefully constructed construct called a standard that benefits us all; and that if we deviate from the proper licensing structure that has been rigorously applied, both in licensing and by courts, we threaten the very structure that we all benefit from.

Why are we here? As the Court knows, we went through a process of determining how many of the claims that Innovatio is asserting are, quote-unquote, essential to the standard, and the Court has determined that they all are essential to the standard. That triggers now that they are all subject to a RAND rate, not a reasonable royalty rate that would happen as a result of a litigation between two competitors.

There is a duty owed here to the standard and the standards community, and it is the duty that you heard nothing about from Mr. McAndrews, because, from their perspective, this is all about maximizing the return to people who purchased patents as opposed to taking into account where these patents and these features fall in this carefully constructed construct.

I'm going to take you through four topics. The first is standards and RAND so we can actually have the context that Innovatio studiously ignores. We're then going to talk about the standard at issue here and where Innovatio's asserted patents actually fall within there, which is crucially important to the apportionment that we have to do, and which

was conspicuously absent from Mr. McAndrews' presentation.

We're going to talk about how do we determine the correct RAND rate here, not in generalities about why it is that, you know, someone feels aggrieved that the number is allegedly small, but trying analytically, through a number of methodologies, to get to the right number, because we all know that that's what the Court wants to do, is to come up with the right number, not with a number that is based on an appeal to, you know, "We deserve more." And then we're going to go through some of Innovatio's positions and show exactly how it is these positions offend the notion of RAND and embrace the problems that courts and others have identified with standards.

Okay. Let's start with standards. And I will go through this quickly because I know the Court is well aware of the value of standards in our life. But Innovatio didn't mention standards at all in its presentation, but that's why we're here.

Standards allow technology to interoperate, and it provides a huge benefit to manufacturers and to consumers.

That means, for example, in the context of wireless, we don't have ten different ways to do wireless.

So, for example, when your granddaughter takes her tablet -- okay? I don't want to leave your granddaughter out of my presentation, you know.

(Laughter.)

MR. CHERNY: And she goes to Starbucks, she can talk to the router at Starbucks, and --

THE COURT: No, she's not yet at that age, but -- going to Starbucks without parental supervision, but --

MR. CHERNY: I wasn't suggesting she was going by herself.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CHERNY: Although, I'm sure she's precocious.

Now, the point being is that all these things can talk to each other, they're all interoperable, and that is a huge benefit to the manufacturers, from the chipmaker on, because they can -- they have a broader audience for their products, and the consumers benefit greatly. So, therefore, your computer will work at any wireless place, and vice versa.

So, as the Department of Justice has noted:
"Standards make networks, such as the internet and wireless
telecommunications, more valuable by allowing products to
interoperate."

We all agree. No one is going to dispute that. But the reason I raise this is because it is the value of standards and the delicate nature of the construct that requires us to act to protect that through a proper RAND analysis, not just some vague notions of one individual contributor's alleged desire to get paid more than everybody else.

And, in fact, as I'm sure you're familiar, Judge

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Robart himself acknowledged, because he understood that the core issue here is the value of standards, not about Mr. Mahany's contributions, which no one is denigrating, but they are one of many contributions in a standard amongst many standards that go into these products.

Okay. How does a standard take place? There are numerous members, almost all implementers, of technology who get together and they submit their contributions. And almost never, if never, are there just one way of doing things. You have sophisticated companies, Cisco, Broadcom, all these companies who submit their offerings, and they're all good choices, almost always. Because if you only have one choice, you don't need the standards-setting organization to choose. That's why the standards-setting organization is there. It's choosing in order less about, you know, going through the best, but they're trying to pick amongst different choices so they can come up with an interoperable set of products. So that, yes, yours might be good, yours might be good, but we need to pick one so that we can all interoperate with each other.

And at the end of the day -- and you will see this motif through my discussion -- you end up with this mosaic called a standard which represents the contributions of tens and hundreds of participants and is covered by thousands of patents.

Because if we lose the concept of the mosaic here,

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what there's a tendency to do, while we're in this room in the litigation, is for the patentee to hyperfocus on their alleged contribution to the earth, but nobody is here from all the other contributors saying, "Here's all the things I contributed. Here's all the parts of the mosaic I contributed." And so what we'll hear is all about the value of Wi-Fi and somehow why Innovatio is entitled to some portion of the value of Wi-Fi in total as opposed to where they fit in the mosaic of this standard.

So, as I discussed, the participants meet. Numerous sophisticated companies contribute ideas. The proposals are reviewed. And then, after a long period of time, many years often, a standard is assembled.

Now, you've heard me talk about the problems -- I mean, the benefits of standards, but there are problems that both this Court and others have recognized inherent in the fact that we are coming together to cooperate to create this standard. One of them is called lock-in and holdup.

What is lock-in and holdup? This is something that Your Honor recognized in the last opinion and that Judge Robart has recognized, and that pretty much everyone other than perhaps Innovatio recognizes as a problem.

It is the fact that a priority, a number of people say, "I'm willing to contribute my technology," but then, upon the adoption of one amongst many, a huge amount of value is

created by the fact that everybody now has agreed to standardize their technology, and they are locked in.

The example that we focus on is instructive, which is the plug. There are numerous standards within countries. And thank the Lord that within the country, we don't have different types of plugs, because we'd be sitting there with adapters and things wouldn't work together. But each of these plugs works, you know, in Europe, Asia. None of them are any better or worse, per se. They're just -- but the point is to just pick one.

And so, for purposes of this discussion, I have assigned them a value of one cent. I mean, it's not very valuable. Because if I don't pick one, I could just adopt the other. And that, as you will hear from Dr. Shoemake, is often the case, that you are not picking one amongst a bunch of other bad ones, but usually the standards-setting organization has numerous choices that are all equally good, and the point is to pick one for interoperability.

So here we have -- in our country, we've chosen the ubiquitous three-prong plug. And in my example, which I'm sure the Court can figure out where I'm going, now it becomes a standard. And someone comes along the line and says, "I've got a patent on the" -- "I contributed to that, and I've got a patent on the plug. Pay me \$5." And if there was nothing to stop that, he could probably get the \$5, because everybody in

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the world or America would have adopted it, put it into their house, and the cost of taking out all the sockets and getting adapters and all that is prohibitive.

That is lock-in and holdup. It is a real problem. It is a primary problem that standards face, and it is one of the reasons why RAND is different. Because in the regular patent case, you do not have this problem where it's either locked in by virtue of the fact that we've bestowed upon you agreement of the organization to choose your technology amongst a number of submissions.

In the standard, we go back to the mosaic, there are literally thousands of contributions covered by patents. And if you allow holdup, any one of those submissions potentially could hold up somebody for the value of the standard. That can't happen. If that happens, there will never be another standard. If people are allowed to -- no one is ever going to agree -- Cisco is never going to agree to standardize something from Alcatel-Lucent if it knows down the road Alcatel-Lucent is going to say, "Oh, you've adopted our technology? We've got a patent on that. Pay us."

Another problem in which Mr. McAndrews has described as theoretical is royalty stacking. It is not theoretical. It is a real problem. It's been recognized by courts and by the standards-setting institutions and that Mr. Shoemake -- or Dr. Shoemake will discuss.

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What is royalty stacking? In fact, although Mr. McAndrews describes this as theoretical, we take a look at *Microsoft versus Motorola*, which is obviously a very relevant case in the sense that Judge Robart was dealing with many of the same issues as are before you, Your Honor, and dealing with the same standard. He said: "The anti-stacking principle is the primary constraint on the upper bound of RAND." And then he concluded a royal rate of 1.15% to 1.73 of the end product price implicates such clear anti-stacking concerns.

What is stacking? When we get together all these implementers who are now trying to create an interoperable product and get the benefits of interoperability and standardization, they realize that with all of these thousands of contributions, if the price of those contributions is so much, such that everybody says, "Pay me \$5. Pay me \$5," eventually that, on top of the cost of putting together the product, plus the fact that there are numerous other standards often in a product, will eventually so burden the product that you will have a standardized product that costs \$15,000, and nobody's going to pay \$15,000 for a laptop. No one -- so what they understand is that the value they get as an audience for their products, that they have a wire audience to sell their products to, and people like Broadcom derive the benefit, they're now going to sell a million chips to people because now everybody is going to need the same type of Wi-Fi as opposed to

only a small sliver.

Royalty stacking is not theoretical. Now, Innovatio says, "Well, there's no evidence that royalty stacking has occurred yet," but the concern with royalty stacking is real. And if people like Innovatio are allowed to, in a proceeding like this, end up with a dollar figure that would never have been adopted by people in the standard, because of their concern for stacking, it will cause other people to say, "Wait a second. If you're going to get 6% of a whole product for your contribution, then I need 6% for my contribution" -- because at some point, I can't have it that I'm only getting 3 cents and you get 6%. And then at that point, the total royalty burden will dwarf the amount.

I've given you an example of a laptop here, its \$300 price with \$150 in profit. Now, remember, not only does the laptop have material costs in it, it also has a number of standards. And I have simplified this on slide 18 to show four standards.

The truth is there is evidence that shows that what goes into a laptop are approximately 251 standards made up of thousands of contributions, each of whom could easily say, "Pay me," you know, and go in with a similar type of presentation as Innovatio and say the value of a laptop to people is wonderful. They could show Marriott and show someone behind a desk at the Marriott with a laptop and say, "The laptop is very valuable to

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the Marriott. Give me 6%." Think about it. There are literally thousands of contributions to multiple standards. There's the H.264 standard, there's Ethernet, there's USB, and there are literally hundreds of standards with thousands of contributions.

Think about 6%, the number they're asking for as a rate. Think about how fast if everybody who contributed to the standard asked even vaguely in the realm of what Innovatio is asking for, how soon the laptop would become unaffordable and the standard would break, because everybody would then say, "I'm better off selling a non-standardized laptop for \$500 myself and just doing my best with a more limited audience than trying to sell one with a royalty burden of thousands and tens of thousands of dollars."

This is the context that Innovatio did not talk about during its opening. This is the context, though, that makes RAND different.

And here's the royalty. First, someone says, "Okay. Give me \$30." And \$30 is actually the amount that approximately that Innovatio is asking for on some of these laptops. So he raises his hands and says, "My contribution is \$30." Okay. Now you've dwarfed the component that actually has the feature on it. Then another couple people say, "Give me \$30," and you're up to -- you've gone -- the profit on the computer is gone. And then some more people say, "Give me

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\$30," because they all view their contributions exactly the way Mr. McAndrews views the contributions of Norand. They all view themselves as valuable contributors to that technology.

And eventually, very shortly, a few tiles of the mosaic have made the standard unpracticable. We have lost the value that we sought to get with standardization because somebody has come in and started a trend by saying, "Give me \$30." It's the mosaic.

How does -- how do we deal with that? We deal with that with RAND. And what RAND is about is essentially a priority. Everybody contributes to the standard and understands that we are creating something bigger than each individual company could do by itself. We create the structure, and RAND says, but we all agree as a priority that we are going to, A, not try to exclude anybody, B, we're going to offer everybody the same rate, and it has to be reasonable in the context of the standard, meaning we're not going to allow each other to hold each other up because we standardized your technology. We're not going to let the stack go so high that the standard now is more expense than it's worth.

So it's not just about somebody from a company saying, "Well, my technology is worth something." It's about all these technologies and the value we've created by putting them together and how we can lose that if we allow what Innovatio wants to happen happen.

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Now, failure to apportion, a key point, as we saw from the slides from Mr. McAndrews attempting to get the value of Wi-Fi or some portion of it, failure to apportion is key to the Federal Circuit across all damages. It is not unique to standards, but it is uniquely a problem in the standards. Because in order to get RAND, you have to figure out what are you applying to, what will be reasonable. So if you just pick out a number and say, "Well, 2%, that doesn't sound very high," 2% of what?

And so the reason we apportion is because the Court has found we have to figure out, from the Supreme Court on down, that it is important to identify the value of your contribution. And we do that by identifying the small salable unit, which I will address in a little bit more detail later on in response to the Court's inquiry, because the broader we go, the more danger there is that you will then get the value of other people's contributions or proprietary contributions and, as a result, you will end up holding people up and the stack will get too high.

And you're not entitled to get a percentage of Wi-Fi. The amount of technology that goes into Wi-Fi is immense. Innovatio is not entitled to it. And so the reason the courts have said you got to focus on the small salable unit as a starting point is to curve the error that would occur from saying, "Well, the value of Wi-Fi to Marriott is X." How can

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we possibly start with Marriott and then try to apportion down from there? That's why we have to start at the smallest salable unit because that constrains the inquiry. So that we are not going to make the very error that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly said we must not make.

So let's take a look at the standard here.

Mr. McAndrews briefly touched on it. I'm going to spend a
little more time on it because it provides the context.

You had numerous sophisticated companies contribute to the 802.11 standard. These people all provided contributions, many of which provided alternative contributions to the ones that got standardized all across. Years were taken to standardize. And the reason it takes years is that they take this seriously.

And why is that relevant? First of all, later standards have to be backwards-compatible with earlier standards. So when you have 802.11n adopted, that still has to work with 802.11a and b. And so they take it seriously. As you're going along, there's inertia that builds up.

There was a suggestion at one of the depositions, I think of Dr. Teece, that if the standard breaks as a result of stacking, we could just adopt a new standard. That is not the case.

This process has a huge amount of inertia in it, such that it has to be guarded all along the way. Because if you

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adopt a new standard, it won't work with all the people who invested in 802.11a and b. So, as the standard progresses, we still have to make sure it works with what happened before. And this compounds the issue of both stacking and holdup and why RAND is so important.

So here's our mosaic. There are 2,680 technical sections in 802.11. You didn't hear that from Mr. McAndrews because he doesn't want to talk about the other contributions to the standard. He only wants to talk about Norand and Mr. Mahany. But there are millions of people and there are companies like Norand and tons of Norands and tons of Mr. Mahanys out there who are contributing to make our mosaic.

The policy. Before you get something standardized, you have to make the commitment to RAND, before. That informs us that this is an *ex ante* inquiry. The whole point is that if you do not agree to RAND before it's standardized, we are not going to standardize your technology because we do not want to be held up. We do not want you to contribute to the stack.

And here is one of the Letters of Assurance that Broadcom gave willingly and in good faith, I hope, where they said that they would provide their technology under reasonable rates -- reasonable under RAND, not reasonable under some appeal to §284 -- to an unrestricted number of applicants -- unrestricted -- on a non-discriminatory basis.

Now, in a normal patent case, you can discriminate.

In fact, that's one of the *Georgia-Pacific* factors that Judge Robart presided. You are allowed to discriminate. You are allowed to try to enjoin somebody. You are allowed to talk about people's, you know, different status in terms of are you a competitor or not. But with RAND, you give all that up, because we are getting together in this cooperative endeavor to create something that will benefit us all. But you give something up in that regard, and what you give up is the ability to try to one on one hold up your competitor, hold up another contributor, hold up an implementer.

Colleen M. Conway, Official Court Reporter

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Where do Innovatio's patents fit? You definitely didn't see anything like this in Mr. McAndrews' presentation because he doesn't want to give you the context of where they fit. He just wants to tell you that Wi-Fi is wonderful and that, "We want our cut." Okay.

There are thousands of contributions to Wi-Fi. This is one little piece I have blown up of the mosaic of many, many technologies in the 802.11 standard. And you have four small parts of this mosaic that are technologies that are relevant to Innovatio's patents. And even with that, Innovatio's patents are essential to subparts of these four parts.

And that's what the Court needs to understand when valuing the patented features, not about Wi-Fi, not about Marriott, not about how much money Cisco makes. It is understanding that these were very focused contributions to a very small part of our mosaic where, as we are going to see, there are numerous alternatives that could have been adopted as well, had people understood at the time that there would be an attempt to hold up the industry.

Innovatio's patents are 23 of over 3,000 standard-essential patents to the 802.11 standard.

Let's put them back in context because we need, as the Court has commanded us to do, to figure out what is the value of the features, the patented features, what is reasonable in the context of the standard. Not let's look at

them in isolation and let's look at Wi-Fi in general.

Now let's take a look how we determine RAND here analytically. It was conspicuously absent from Innovatio's presentation, any analysis. There was literally declarations that Wi-Fi is worth X to Marriott; therefore, we should take -- I mean, I believe, if I could quote it, Mr. McAndrews said, "Well, you know, a laptop, we feel that Wi-Fi is 10% of the value of a laptop. Give us 6% of that." It's not about the value of Wi-Fi to a laptop. It's about the value of these features. Let's figure out the right way.

First of all, let me go through the witnesses that you're going to hear. It's obligatory. We have to introduce you to them because they're in the courtroom and they would feel slighted if I don't tell you --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. CHERNY: -- who they are. Okay. You have met Mr. Shoemake. Dr. Shoemake, I do not believe I'm exaggerating, will probably be the most knowledgeable person in the room when it comes to standards, wireless, 802.11. He actually was there when 802.11, various sections were adopted. You met him during, I believe, the hot-tubbing session we had. And for purposes of the record, that was the session during the essentiality hearing where the judge took commentary from the various experts about the process.

He is extremely knowledgeable, and he's going to

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testify about RAND rules, why they were adopted, as someone who participated in 802.11, to prevent holdup and stacking, how -the cost of implementing alternatives. Because if you're going to charge me 6% of a laptop, or 3% of a laptop, and I could implement an equally good alternative for two cents, there's no chance I would ever agree to that. And that's why we have to go back to the hypothetical negotiation at the time and determine what truly would be the value of Innovatio's alleged contributions here. That there are thousands of standard-essential patents and he's going to help us apportion, he's going to help us do what we need to do.

There's Professor Wicker, who you also met at the last proceeding, again, an eminent scientist with impeccable credentials in the area of wireless. He's going to show you just how minor the features that the patents are directed to are, and he's going to talk about the numerous alternatives that were available.

Because, remember, there were literally tens of companies submitting very, very good alternatives, and the point is to choose one for interoperability, not because someone has declared, like a beauty contest, this is the most beautiful choice. It's just about choosing so that they can interoperate. And he's going to help us identify the smallest salable units here, which is the Wi-Fi chip, because that is what -- first of all, that is why all these patents are

essential to 802.11, because this all resides on the chip.

And, as we'll see in a little bit, yes, the claims have other structure. And, as this Court has recognized, you can add other structure to a claim -- you could add a keyboard, you could add a processor, you could add -- but they didn't invent any of those things. They don't get the value of that.

So it is a misstatement of the Federal Circuit's doctrine to suggest that somehow they're requiring you to give them the value of every element that they throw in. Because at that point, you are giving an incentive to say -- have my independent claim, Claim 15, that says "sleep" mode, which resides in the chip, and then say Claim 30 wherein the "sleep" mode occurs in a hundred-thousand-dollar super computer.

Mr. McAndrews would say, "They're ignoring my hundred-thousand-dollar super computer." You know, "I need to get a part of that." But that's not what the invention is.

And so that's why we need to apportion down.

You'll see today Mr. Djavaherian who's going to provide real-world objective context to the value of these patents, because Broadcom owned them for ten years, and they sold -- they bought them from Intermec and they sold them, and they are a part of the standard. And they understand a lot better than Innovatio the value and constraints on this property.

You're going to hear from Dr. Leonard, an eminent --

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you have not been introduced to him unlike the other experts -- an eminent economist who has specialized in the analysis of RAND and standardization and why RAND and standardization require a little bit different analysis than just the regular, old unmodified reasonable royalty analysis.

And you're going to hear from Dr. Lynde, who HP will offer, who's actually one of the experts in front of Judge Robart who he, as you read through the opinion, cites with great approval.

So, now, let's get down to -- now I have satisfied the egos of the experts and the witnesses, now let's move on to how we're going to help you do what you need to do, and what was conspicuously absent from Innovatio's presentation, which is how do we do this in an analytical way, not in a qualitative, you know, "I need to get paid" way.

First, we're going to apportion. And this part of the presentation is meant, in some respects, to respond to your inquiry, Your Honor.

So we take a look at *LaserDynamics* from Judge Rader.

And it says: "Thus, it is generally required that royalties be based not on the entire product, but instead on the 'smallest salable patent-practicing unit.'"

Why is that? Why the stuff about the "smallest salable patent-practicing unit"? Because there's a realization by the Federal Circuit that you can start anywhere in the

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valuation process, but the farther out you go from the patented feature, the more chance there is of error that's unacceptable and of giving value for what you did not invent.

And so, take my pointer here, or my clicker. Okay? And say we have an invention that relates to, I don't know, this button over here. I mean, it's a fine button. I'm sure somebody one day will come into your courtroom and tell you that they deserve the value of everything because of this button.

But we have this button here. Now, I could start off by saying: Well, I'm using it in this room. Let's start apportioning down. I could even say -- I could even claim it and say the use of this clicker in a courtroom to present information to a Court, but that wouldn't mean anything, because what we have to do is say: Okay. The invention really resides in this button.

And why the Court mandates that we go to the smallest salable unit is that if we start in the room, I've got to apportion away those chairs and I've got to get rid of all these things. And when I'm doing this, there's a chance that I'm going to give you a percentage of that phone.

But if we start here -- and the reason they go for a salable unit, because this is something that has been priced. So we know somewhat concretely what this thing is worth. So we say maybe this is \$6, this clicker. Let's -- but we don't

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start -- stop there. We start there. And we say now we start from \$6 and I start apportioning down the value of the button in there, the patented feature, and the most mistake I could make, then, is constrained by the fact that I have started at the \$6 thing and not at the \$60,000 courtroom.

Now, Mr. McAndrews took Dr. Leonard to task for his wording of the standard. The wording of the standard here in terms of small salable unit comes from Judge Rader right there, "smallest salable infringing unit with close relation to the claimed invention."

It is an invitation to error to try to suggest to the Court that smallest salable patented unit somehow means that every element that I throw in there -- and whereas here the other side's expert has agreed that it's all the MAC and the PHY -- that somehow I put up a claim, I identify seven other pieces that someone has thrown into a claim that he says are structural, and that, therefore, that means we're not going to go down to the smallest salable unit that actually has the patented features, the parts that are essential to the standard here.

Next slide. Oh, that's me. Now, in response to your inquiry, we did some looking. And I think we can get to the heart of this in terms of the Federal Circuit's words on this point.

The seminal case that led to much of this, other than

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the Supreme Court's original *Garrettson* case, is the *Lucent* case. And when we look at the *Lucent* case, it clears it all up. Because the *Lucent* case, even though it doesn't use the phrase coined by Judge Rader, every case since then has cited *Lucent* as essentially the beginning of the smallest salable unit doctrine.

In *Lucent*, you had this invention to a touchscreen form entry system, but really the inventive aspect was these -- this ability to have a touch-sensitive screen where you had these fields, that you could choose the fields. It wasn't the apparatus. It was the software in the computer. Because, otherwise, if you gave someone the value of the hardware, you'd have people over and over again re-getting the value of that computer every time they added software.

Let's take a look at the claim. You asked for a method claim. That's exactly what was at issue in *Lucent*, a method for use in a computer. Okay. Mr. McAndrews would say we don't want to ignore that valuable piece of hardware, a computer, having a display. We don't want to, you know, avoid the display. But these are not part of the invention. These are just almost the context of the invention. And then you get displaying a pre-defined tool associated with one of said fields. Now we have to actually figure out what the invention is.

So it's not about how much hardware we can work into

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the claim. It's about identifying what really is the inventive feature here and identifying that in the context of the accused product so we can apportion correctly.

Here's LaserDynamics talking about Lucent. So even though Lucent didn't specifically say small salable unit, it is the case that started it.

Judge Rader says: "Our decision in *Lucent* is illustrative. There, the patent at issue involved a helpful and convenient 'date picker' feature that was being used within the grand scheme of Microsoft's Outlook email software. We held that because the patented feature was 'but a tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program,' a royalty could not be properly calculated based on the value of the entire Outlook program because 'there was no evidence that anybody anywhere at any time ever bought Outlook.'"

But what did they do in *Lucent*? They got down and started at Outlook and then started apportioning down from there. They didn't start apportioning down from the computer. There's no attempt to say, "Well, you could value the display, the computer."

AVM versus Intel, again, identifying Lucent as the seminal case in this area. Recently, Judge Andrews in Delaware Daubert'ed an expert on this very point, and he said: "The use of a salable unit that is greater than the patented feature is going to introduce Uniloc error when the patented feature is a

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'date picker,'" obviously referring to *Lucent*, "whether the salable unit is a computer loaded with 'Outlook' or simply 'Outlook.'" We've got to get down to the date picker. We are not going to start at the computer.

"Further, as LaserDynamics holds, the difficulty in determining a royalty base in a situation such as this one with dynamic logic circuits is not a reason to accept an unreliable method." It may be difficult, but it requires us to get together and pick where the actual inventive feature resides.

Now, we are lucky in that regard, because you will see testimony from both Dr. Wicker and admissions from Dr. Nettleton that this invention resides on the Wi-Fi chip, which is not surprising. Each of these claims is essential to the Wi-Fi standard, all of which resides on the Wi-Fi chip. So regardless, if it is in different contexts, such as Wi-Fi using a keyboard, Wi-Fi with a processor, Wi-Fi with something else, it is on the Wi-Fi chip.

And here's the problem that we are so worried about. You heard Mr. McAndrews ask you numerous times for the value of a laptop. He was very explicit about it. There are 251-plus standards in a laptop. Put aside all the non-standardized aspects that might be proprietary to someone like HP. 251-plus. And if we start at the laptop by giving Innovatio 1.8% of a laptop, not only -- we are potentially giving them 1.8% of the Bluetooth, 1.8% of the trackpad, 1.8% of the

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graphics card, and that is exactly the error the court has held to be unacceptable, why we have to get down to the smallest salable unit, why we cannot just say "laptop" and then say, "Give me a percentage of that."

When you think about the fact that there are 251-plus standards, all people who have patented -- with thousands of contributors who have patents, who could all come in and say, "Give me 1.8%" -- remember 251 standards, each with thousands of contributors, 1.8, that puts it in context where 1.8% is huge. That's why if you're going to get 1.8%, you better have invented the transistor. All the technology is on the Wi-Fi chip that is relevant here.

And, in fact, you don't just end with a salable unit. You start with the smallest salable unit, as the *Dynetix* court found recently in California. That just starts you at -- we have now cabined off the value down to my clicker. Now let's figure out what the value of the button is.

So, here, we have a Wi-Fi chip, a chip. It's got technology related to the input and the output. It has semiconductor technology. It has interface logic. It has memory. Each of these things, by the way, Innovatio could certainly throw into a claim, but that they had nothing to do with. There's the RF contribution. And then you have Wi-Fi. And then you have residing on this chip where the 802.11 standard's physical manifestation exists. And that's where we

have to go to -- and then within that, we have to figure out -- within that 3,000-patent construct, we have to figure out what the value of Innovatio's contribution or, in this case, really Norand's contribution, the patents that they hold.

Now, we've heard about the MAC and the PHY. In fact, at the last hearing, you heard over and over again all about how this is all about the MAC and the PHY. I think Mr. Schodde told you this is all about the MAC and the PHY. And Dr.

Nettleton was asked:

"You admit that most, if not all, of the PHY functionality is on the Wi-Fi chip, right?

"Yes.

"In some instances, all the MAC functionality is implemented on the Wi-Fi chip?"

He actually said: "Most, if not all, yes."

It's all on the Wi-Fi chip. There may be some tiny insignificant thing elsewhere, but that's where this technology resides.

Now, here's what we were talking about before, Claim 15. That's the "sleep" mode, undoubtedly on the Wi-Fi chip. Then you have Claim 30. Claim 30 is the dependent claim, narrower, certainly less, quote-unquote, valuable. And now we have "utilizing a processor." They didn't invent the processor. But according to Mr. McAndrews, it says the processor, he should get a portion of the processor.

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It is exactly this type of thing as the reason why the Court is so careful about asking for apportionment down to the smallest salable unit.

Claim 82, "further comprising utilizing a keyboard." They didn't invent a keyboard. And, in fact, as you identified in the last go-round, much of this basic technology that is being used is in conjunction with the invention. Because when we claim we have to provide a context at times, it is not itself the value of the patented feature. And that's why this is no different than *Lucent*, where they couldn't get the value of the display and the value of the computer, and even the value of all of Outlook. They got the value of the date picker.

So we start out and we figure out where to start.

Now, we have to look at where do Innovatio's patents reside in that.

It is undisputed there are thousands of patents relevant to 802.11 that are essential. You will hear testimony about PA Consulting who regularly does this analysis, who said, from their estimation, 3,106. Another company, Sunlight, estimates 4,000. Mr. Evans, Innovatio's expert, is at least willing to acknowledge a thousand or more standard-essential patents. Remember, they only have 23.

And Judge Robart, on the same standard, thousands of 802.11 standard-essential patents, including the patents at

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issue in his case, which, as we're going to go later on, are a pretty nice benchmark. And you know something? I bet you that, you know, the patentee there probably said, "Ours are worth a lot." And, in fact, we know they did. And guess what? They were held to exactly the same ranges we're talking here, because we're all part of this construct, because we have to put it in context.

And here's the context. If you gave everybody the value that Innovatio is asking for in the standard, the price of things, this is where the royalty stack is real. So the fact that a priority to date, other people haven't gotten this and haven't been able to burden the standard is not an invitation for Innovatio to say, "Well, let me begin the stack."

And right now, we actually have across this land numerous companies who are asserting patents, each of them in a courtroom trying to do exactly what the standard was meant to stop, which is they're trying to stack it up in ways that are wholly disproportional to the role they play in terms of the value of the patented feature to the standard.

Dr. Leonard will go through and he'll say, "Look, average Wi-Fi chip price over 2000-2015 was \$4." Actually, that's pretty high. Nowadays, a chip costs about a dollar. The profit, 48 cents. Taking a look at the -- you know, the share of Innovatio's patents to the whole, whether you pick

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3,000, 4,000, you multiply that and you get .37 cents to .59 cents, just accepting that all the other people made contributions. That would be if you treat them all equal, which, by the way, the evidence is going to show, quite frankly, these are less than equal. But then he gives them the benefit of the doubt and he says, "You know something? Let me value this in a way that actually gives them the benefit of the doubt," and says, "I'm going to assume that these are in the top 50%. I'll even assume that they might be in the top 20% of patents. I'll even go for the top 10%." And he then uses that to get an approximate range that's relevant. And even at that level, if they're in the top 10% of patents, standard-essential patents, the most they could get is 3.09 cents because it's part of a construct. It doesn't exist in isolation.

And by doing this type of analysis, this rigorous analysis, we end up with a royalty that is properly apportioned and that is non-discriminatory. It doesn't say I get a portion of the chip, gives me this, or I get a different price if I apply it to the laptop that happens to have the chip. It's all the same. But going to the smallest salable unit and then applying this type of logic, we get a rate that's consistent from the chip user to the chipmaker to the ultimate product maker.

Ex ante alternatives, a very, very powerful analysis and, in many ways, actually avoids even the issue of the

smallest salable unit.

What are *ex ante* alternatives? You remember when we talked about RAND, it's a bargain you strike *ex ante*. You say, "Before we standardize you, I'm going to give RAND." Why is that? Because we have options to pick other people at that time.

Now, if it turns out that you're coming up and saying, "I want to get a holdup value because I've been standardized," we go back and take a look at what would it cost -- if we went to back to the negotiation, if I could go back and make another choice, how much would it cost me to pick one of the other alternatives? I would never pay more than it would cost me to pick one of these five alternatives proposed by sophisticated companies to do the exact same thing in this very limited area of the standard.

They say this is complicated. This is exactly the analysis that's in every hypothetical negotiation that's done across the land. We go back and say, "Well, you're telling me that I would pay you a dollar." Yeah, but I could switch for five cents. I would never pay you a dollar at the hypothetical negotiation if I had this alternative. In the context of standards, it's actually more applicable because we're not positing alternatives. There are alternatives. People have submitted alternatives because there are all these possibilities out there, and we're just choosing for

interoperability.

This is particularly important. Here's Dr. Nettleton in his deposition:

"You agree at the time of Wi-Fi standardization, there were a number of alternatives available to the patented technology, right?

"Yes."

You are going to hear that from Dr. Wicker. And each of these people would have been happy to have their contributions standardized. And each one of them who wasn't got nothing. And each of them would have been happy at that point to say, "Look, I'm happy to take the RAND rate if you pick me," as opposed to nothing. And each of these are an alternative that someone says, "Pay me \$28," they would have said, "Well, we would have taken a typical RAND rate of," you know, 2.6 cents or .8 cents because it's being multiplied times millions of units of sales.

You are going to hear Dr. Wicker. And, Your Honor, I appreciate your patience. You know, I'm trying to be very rigorous in going through this. I only have a short period more to go.

But you are going to hear Dr. Wicker who's going to identify rigorously the alternatives that correspond to Dr. Nettleton's admission, which is that there were numerous alternatives for the patented technology, each one of them, any

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one of them who would have been happy to have their technology standardized, okay, but who ended up not being standardized and, as a result, they don't get anything.

And so Dr. Leonard goes through and says, "How much would it cost if I need to switch over back when? If I was being held up, what would I" -- "what would be my choice for the holdup?" And it's about 26 cents -- 2 cents a unit. Not 26, .26 cents. If I said 26 again, my clients are going to jump over and kill me. Okay? .26 cents a unit. That's reality. This is the kind of analysis that you're going to see that people do all the time and that everybody acknowledges is the most relevant because it doesn't even require you to focus on the base because it's base independent. Whether it's on the chip or whether it's on the product, it's the same cost that's in terms of what would we have paid to do an alternative.

And here's a nice graphic that shows you that here we're being held up for \$28.73, which is a real number -- it's not a made-up number -- for a product. And my alternative, going back, I said: Wait a second. Had I known that back then, I would have just adopted these guys for .26 cents. Why would I ever have paid any more? I would have taken a different path.

Okay. Then, of course, I know the Court is aware of Judge Robart's analysis, which actually, in some respects, tries to characterize all the things we just talked about and

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tries to weed out all the stuff that's being -- Innovatio tries to consider. It tries to weed out holdup value. It weeds out the fact that someone's a competitor. It weeds out the fact that you may have a policy. You know -- and by the time he goes through the factors, in many ways, he's trying to create a legal standard to capture the economics of what I have just discussed, from the smallest salable unit down up to how do you do a RAND rate.

And when we look at his benchmark factors -- you heard Mr. McAndrews, with great disdain -- I could talk about the numbers that were offered here by us in terms of our identification, and you look at what Judge Robart rigorously came out with, for patents in the exact same standard -- it came out to be .8 to 3.47 cents -- I think that's pretty probative.

I mean, it's easy when you're not providing the context, and it's easy when you're not providing the fact that this is over millions and millions of devices to say .8. That's laughable. Judge Robart didn't find it laughable because it's real. It's based on the fact that you have thousands of contributors to a standard who aren't -- we cannot allow them to be held up and we cannot allow for a stack.

So we follow these rigorous analyses. We end up all -- and always in the same ballpark, not identical, but every one of them comes out around the same area, and that's

pretty good evidence that we're probably right.

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Okay. Now, let's take a quick breeze through Innovatio's positions. What's wrong with what they're trying to do?

You're going to hear from Mr. Bergey. Mr. Bergey is the fellow who does their feature factor analysis, which is essentially just a hand wave where he says, here's the value of Wi-Fi to a laptop.

that to Innovatio and give you part of the value.

And he was asked: "Did you actually offer an opinion as to whether the difference in price or apportioned value between different access points," meaning that he actually takes different access points and because the end price of the different access points is different -- so, for example, there might be a hundred-dollar access point and a \$20 access point. And since he applies the same feature factor to both, he ends up with a different price. Okay? So, for example, he says 95% of value is Wi-Fi. He then ends up with one price for the \$20 access point and one price for the hundred-dollar access point. He says -- he was asked: "Did you do any attempt to apportion what difference in the value comes from the actual patented features?" Meaning that does this -- oops. There we go. You know, what part of that comes from the patented features? "No. I did not."

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AVM confirms. What we have here? He's embracing Uniloc error because he didn't apportion it out. He didn't -- he just said you get some percentage of the laptop, you get some percentage of the access point, and these things all cost different things.

He does this vague notion where he says -- he starts off with a 6% base royalty. That's a big part of the problem. You know how he gets that 6%? He takes the royalty that came out of the *Symbol/Proxim* case, which was the actual litigation between competitors, which was done under an unmodified reasonable royalty analysis and that Judge Robart explicitly threw out because it was not RAND. It is in his opinion. He says, "Let me start with 6%." And then he says, "Okay. I'm going to tell you that I think that Wi-Fi is worth 30% of the tablet." And so he comes up with 1.8%. It just goes into the black box of Mr. Bergey's feature factor and comes out.

He never says anything about the value of Innovatio's technology or that -- you know, the 2900 other patents. It's just 1.8%. So at the end of the day, you get 1.8% of a tablet, 5.7% of an access point.

Now, remember, in his prior technology -- in his prior testimony where he says the access points have different prices, as they do, Innovatio gets the benefit of that, even though there's no attempt to figure out how Innovatio in any way relates the difference between a \$20 access point or a

hundred-dollar access point.

And, in fact, this is exactly the type of analysis that LaserDynamics criticizes, where they said that Mr. Murtha, the expert there, using vague qualitative notions of the relative importance of the ODD technology. I submit that we have vague qualitative notions from Mr. Bergey of the value of Wi-Fi, and then he just does that, comes up with these numbers and says, "Now, give me that percentage of the overall product." But that's wrong. That leads to error.

And here's how we know. This is what we -- remember I pointed out his testimony about how he didn't in any way attribute the difference to the patented features? Here are two HP accused laptops. They are the same model number, 8770w. The only differences are, for example, a different graphics card, a different processor, a different display. It's the exact same Wi-Fi chip, the exact same one. Okay?

Now, HP sells one for 2,839, sells the other for \$1729 because there's other technology in there, such as the display and the graphics card, et cetera.

Mr. Bergey says that Innovatio should be paid \$16.97 on the first, \$10.37 on the second. You now have a tangible example of the problem when people don't apportion.

So, now, there is -- and there's -- and he does not claim that somehow any of the value -- the difference between 2839 and 1729, or the 10 to 16, results from Innovatio's

contributions or their patented features in any way.

And, in fact, when you think about 16.97, think about my prior slide that there are 251 standards embodied in a laptop with thousands and thousands of contributions. Think about what 1697, how if everybody started asking for that, how we wouldn't have any laptops, certainly not standardized ones.

There's another important admission by Mr. Bergey.

"Did you do any analysis of the importance of the patented
features in relation to any other features in 802.11?

"I did not."

Why is that relevant? If you're going to come in and say that you deserve \$16.97, which is wholly disproportional when you think about the fact that there's 3,000 standard-essential patents, you better do some analysis explaining why it is that your patented feature somehow deserves so much more than everybody else's. It's the mosaic again. He did not.

Remember when we did the mosaic and we saw how narrow these four little areas were and their contributions were, and somehow that leads on a laptop to \$16.97.

Dr. Nettleton, in his report, talks about how he felt that Innovatio's patents were as valuable or more valuable than the legendary Qualcomm patents. He says that. And his testimony, he was asked: "Isn't it true that you didn't actually review any of the Qualcomm patents?" It's very easy

to say I believe our stuff is as valuable as the legendary Qualcomm patents. That's a great standard to start with. And he said: "That's true. I didn't actually look at any of the Qualcomm patents." And that led to one of the most amazing admissions here.

"Okay. And so you don't have to agree with me, Dr. Nettleton, that your conclusion that the Innovatio patents are of at least equal to or greater importance to the standard, to the 802.11 standard as the Qualcomm patents literally has no defensible basis.

"You could say that."

That is emblematic of the non-rigorous analysis that we have here, where people just come in and say things like Wi-Fi -- you know, we get 6% of Wi-Fi or of a laptop. Anyway, these patents are as valuable as the Qualcomm patents without ever looking at the Qualcomm patents or without ever looking at any of the other patents in the mosaic.

In fact, we have actual evidence that they are worth less. Innovatio represented to you that 95% of Innovatio's asserted claims cover optional features, 95%. Mr. Bergey did admit on deposition that "optional features are less valuable." That's because they're optional. The holdup value certainly is less when you have an option as opposed to when it's mandatory.

And, in fact, Judge Robart acknowledged that when apportionment is not used by the implementer, it may have

little value to the implementer.

If you take a look here, here are some of the patented features, how often they are used. As you can see from our very graphic, someone being hit by lightning, unfortunately, they happen very, very rarely. These patents are, if anything, worth less -- we actually gave them the benefit of the doubt in Dr. Leonard's analysis of putting them in the top 50%. But 95% of these go to optional features, by their own admission.

They haven't satisfied the entire market value rule, which is the only thing that would allow them to get up to the entire product. Because in the entire market value rule, you have to say that somehow -- if you want to get away from the smallest salable unit, you got to justify that the demand for the product is driven by your feature. And, in fact, Judge Andrews Daubert'ed on that very point. And he said: "Assuming for the sake of argument that dynamic logic circuits are the single most important part of Intel's microprocessors" -- he's willing to say, "I'll give" -- "I'll take the most important part of the microprocessor," it is still a long haul to conclude that they drive demand for the entire microprocessor. So, therefore, you are Daubert'ed because you did not go to the smallest salable unit.

There is no evidence that anybody goes into a Best Buy and buys a laptop and says, "I'll take up the cost of the

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Innovatio channel access." That's what they'd have to prove to get the whole laptop. And *LaserDynamics* says: "Proof that consumers would not want a laptop without such features is not tantamount to proof that any one of those features alone drives the market for laptop computers."

You want to get the value of a laptop, you don't want to be on the smallest salable unit, you don't want to be on the chip where your technology resides, prove that no one is going in there and saying -- people are going in there and saying, "I'm not buying a laptop unless it has Innovatio channel access," as opposed to any other things in the standard or any of the alternatives.

Now, this is particularly probative. We asked their licensing expert, Mr. Evans, who was actually the same expert in Judge Andrews' court in the AVM case, we said: Is it okay -- you know, patent holdup allows someone to get the value due to the fact that the patented features are standardized. And he said: Even without FRAND, the value of the technology should not be limited to its incremental value. If you are not limiting to its incremental value, you're holding up.

But we don't have to rely only on Mr. Evans.

Dr. Teece that you heard about was asked: "In your opinion, in connection with 802.11, there may be circumstances in which a RAND royalty could include the value of a patented feature due to its standardization." Yeah, if it's consistent with the

balancing of interests, it could.

Uh-uh. You gave that up. When the patents were LOA, you gave that up. And that's exactly what Judge Robart said, which is: We will "not consider the value associated with incorporation of the patented technology."

You have here overt holdup, and that's exactly why this Court has to go back and make sure we give a RAND royalty, not a royalty that reflects the value of standardization.

We heard about the fact of stacking. I don't need to dwell on it anymore because I think the Court understands all the things that goes into the stack here. It is not theoretical. And here are some of the many people who are trying in the present day to contribute to the stack. Okay?

That's a big snowball. And, thankfully, it's not about to hit the courthouse. Okay? But you would think --

THE COURT: Who came up with the snowball there? (Laughter.)

MR. CHERNY: Who came up with the snowball? There, that fellow, Tim Majors back there.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CHERNY: Okay. So you would think with all the negative press about royalty stacking that Innovatio would actually distance themselves from royalty stacking. You would think that -- they say it's theoretical. It's not theoretical. Look what Dr. Teece says:

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"Once royalty stacking occurs, you believe you can create a new standard at that point; that's what you need to do is create a new standard?"

Now, we know that that's not possible because it took ten years to get to the present -- or now 15 years. And here's -- this is probative.

"Let's make it clear. Let's distinguish between good stacking and bad stacking. You know, my fundamental premise here is that stacking is actually usually something good."

Judge Robart disagrees. He says that "the anti-stacking principle is the primary constraint on the upper bound of RAND."

You have them saying that we embrace holdup, we embrace stacking, because it's not surprising. Because from their perspective, they bought patents, okay, and all they want to do is maximize the value for what they purchased, and they don't want to think about the context of these patents where we're dedicated, in the sense of the Letters of Assurance, where everybody in the standard assured each other we're going to play by the rules and we're going to set the value according to RAND.

And here's what happens when the stack goes up.

There's 92 -- this is just for Wi-Fi. And this is actually not even at the chip level. Even if it was the access point, it would quickly go past if you gave them exactly what they're

breach of a contract by Judge Robart and by the jury.

But the actual amount wasn't 2.25%. It was .8 to 3.471 cents.

They say that -- remember, because they weren't -- they didn't own the patents at the relevant time. They say that the people owned the patents would have extracted that value in a hypothetical negotiation. Now, of course, we know they sold it for far, far less, so it's wholly unbelievable.

But we actually have Broadcom in the modern day writing to the FTC decrying the problem of holdup. There's no chance that Broadcom would be a participant to holdup.

Now, at this point, I'd like to ask our colleagues from John Marshall to leave.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CHERNY: I have only got like four more slides.

THE COURT: You are welcome to come back, but I think we will take a break after Mr. Cherny is concluded. So if you want to hang around the courthouse, we'll take a break and then you'll know you could come back.

PROFESSOR YUAN: Sure.

THE COURT: Although, I understand that you're seeking to have exclusion in connection --

MR. CHERNY: With Djavaherian.

THE COURT: -- with the first witness.

MR. CHERNY: Yes.

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                             Cherny - opening
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                THE COURT: All right. So I leave it up to you,
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      Professor.
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                PROFESSOR YUAN:
                                 Sure.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                PROFESSOR YUAN:
                                Thank you.
                THE COURT: Thank you, all, for coming. Appreciate
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      it.
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            (Members of audience exited courtroom.)
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                MR. CHERNY: I'm told there are also people from
10
      Ericsson in the courtroom. If that's the case, I'd ask them to
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      leave as well.
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                I only have three more slides, I think, Your Honor,
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      SO --
                THE COURT: Well, let me just make sure, did the
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      Ericsson people exclude you in Judge Davis' courtroom?
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                MR. CHERNY: I do not know.
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                            No. I'm joking. That's all right.
                THE COURT:
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                MR. CHERNY:
                             Okay.
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           (Laughter.)
20
                MR. CHERNY: People exclude me all the time for
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      reasons that have nothing to do with protective orders.
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                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
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                MR. CHERNY: Okay. Let's go to the next slide.
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           (CAUTION: Confidential pursuant to protective order:)
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THE COURT: All right. I think we will take a break

Thank you, Your Honor.

at this point. Let my court reporter -- let her fingers rest for a moment.

MR. CHERNY: I apologize.

THE COURT: All right. We will stand in recess for ten minutes and then I will hear from other counsel.

Let me go off the record on scheduling.

(Discussion held off the record. Recess.)

THE COURT: All right. We are ready to proceed with further opening remarks.

Mr. Anderson, you may proceed.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS SONICWALL AND HP

MR. ANDERSON: I represent SonicWALL, as you know, but I've been asked to make basically three points on behalf of both SonicWALL and the Defendant Hewlett-Packard, HP.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: And they've contributed to remarks. I'm not going to rehash ground that has already been covered,

but I want to briefly address three points.

And the first is I'd like to elaborate about the accused SonicWALL and HP products here. Those are the accused

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1 products.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: And let me start with SonicWALL.

SonicWALL, Your Honor, is a firewall company. And the term "firewall" in the computing world refers to a software- and hardware-based network security system, and this security system controls the incoming and outgoing network traffic by basically looking at each and every data packet.

And the security system has a set of software-based rules, and these rules tell the system either allow the data packet to come into the system or allow the data packet to leave. In short, it is a firewall between a trusted network, a secure internal network and some other external network like the internet that is not necessarily secure or trusted. And I'm sure that this courthouse and most of the companies represented in this courtroom use some kind of firewall.

And I wanted to share with you -- I'll give you a preview of some of the testimony by SonicWALL's John Gmeunder. It's G-m-e-u-n-d-e-r. He is the vice president of engineering. And he testified about what a firewall is and what the SonicWALL company does. And I've got his testimony up here on the screen. And I'm not going to read it. But this question was asked by Innovatio's lawyer at Mr. Gmeunder's deposition. He was asked why choose a SonicWALL wireless product, and Gmeunder answers that for SonicWALL, it's firewall, it's

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security. And then he goes on to explain what the security system does, as I've explained here today, that it is basically making a decision whether packets, individual data packets are allowed to enter the system or exit the system.

And here, on the second slide, Mr. Gmeunder says -"What's the purpose of a wireless option for a customer's
firewall?"

He says it's "just another form of conductivity, 802.11 conductivity." And, in fact, SonicWALL sells both wired and wireless firewalls. And when it comes with the wireless feature, it's just an added chip or module that allows conductivity wirelessly.

And with that context or background about what a firewall system is, you have heard from Innovatio's lawyer that they want to assess a royalty on 20 to 50% of the value of a firewall. Their expert says that 20 to 50% is the feature factor of a firewall. And we believe the evidence will show that that is not a factually-based assertion.

And, of course, even if it were somehow true that 20 to 50% of a wireless firewall was attributable to Wi-Fi technology, which it's not, the point that Mr. Cherny made earlier this morning is right on point, namely, that Innovatio, of course, did not invent wireless.

So I wanted to point out that these firewalls are complex hardware and network security systems. Wireless is

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just one method of conductivity. And the apportionment approach that Innovatio takes here is not any kind of an apportionment approach that has been sanctioned by any of the courts' precedence in the area.

And the same point could be made about

Hewlett-Packard. That's a very diverse technology company that

makes laptops, desktops, computers, desktops, laptops, and also

printers. And I want to just take printers for example.

Some printers do have wireless conductivity, and Innovatio is accusing those. And Innovatio is asserting a feature factor of up to 20% of a printer's value. They say that up to 20% of a wireless printer is accounted for by 802.11 technology, and they would assess their royalty, their tax on up to 20% of the price of a wireless HP computer. And, of course, these HP printers, like HP laptops and HP desktops, contain a vast universe of technology, much of which is patented by many, many others, but none of which is patented by Innovatio.

So let me move on to my second point, and this second point is just a little bit more preview about a witness that -- Dr. Matthew Lynde. He spells it L-y-n-d-e, but it's pronounced Lynde. And he will be called by SonicWALL and HP. And Dr. Lynde is a Ph.D. economist. And you will recall, Your Honor, that Dr. Lynde did testify in the *Microsoft/Motorola* trial with Judge Robart, and Dr. Lynde's testimony is credited

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by Judge Robart.

And a particular fact about which Dr. Lynde is going to testify that I wanted to highlight is his testimony about the Via licensing pool. That's V-i-a, V-i-a licensing. It was a licensing pool formed early in the life of 802.11. It was formed at a time before there was a huge capital investment by the major players in Wi-Fi technology.

And, basically, several holders of standard-essential 802.11 patents formed this patent pool and they agreed among themselves as to what a RAND royalty would look like. And although no patent pool or any other benchmark is ever perfect, this is a benchmark that Dr. Lynde thought was a good benchmark.

And I've put up on the screen paragraphs 554 and 562 from Judge Robart's findings of fact in the *Microsoft/Motorola* case, and here you see Judge Robart agreeing "that the Via Licensing 802.11 patent pool is an indicator of a RAND royalty rate for Motorola's 802.11 standard-essential patent" -- or "standard-essential patent portfolio."

So I just wanted to preview that we're going to present through Dr. Lynde some of the same testimony that Judge Robart heard about the value of patent licensing pools and particularly about the value of the Via licensing pool, 802 -- their 802.11 patent licensing pool.

And the final point I want to make -- and I realize

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that time is of the essence here, so I'm going to move through this -- I want to -- we wanted to comment -- we, SonicWALL and HP, want to comment on a statement that we saw in Innovatio's trial brief that we believe is inaccurate.

And I've quoted the statement here, which it appears in Innovatio's trial brief at page 22. And, as we understand this argument, which appears several times in Innovatio's trial brief, Innovatio is arguing that because the patents have been found by this Court to be essential to the 802.11 standard, that the Court should not consider, in setting a RAND royalty rate, whether there were technically feasible alternatives available to the standards-setting organization, and we would respectfully suggest that that is incorrect.

And here you can see Innovatio stating that because the Court held that Innovatio's 23 patents are, in fact, essential as a matter of law, and then they say parenthetically "which provides further confirmation that there were no commercially or technically feasible alternatives at the time the standard was adopted," and we would suggest that that doesn't confirm any such thing.

To be sure, the IEEE definition of a standard-essential patent claim, which I've put up on a slide here, that definition, under that definition, there can be no commercially and technically feasible non-infringing alternative in order to qualify as a standard-essential patent

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under the IEEE standard. But that is a wholly different question from whether the standard -- whether at a time before the standard was implemented, the standards-making body had technology options to choose from before incorporating one of those options in the standard. I think that was the point that Mr. Cherny made with his slides about the tollgate and the car going around the circle and reemerging.

And that, I would respect -- I would respectfully suggest, is the correct analysis; namely, you have to look *ex* ante before the standard was adopted to determine whether or not the standards-making organization had available to it reasonable technically feasible alternatives from which to make a choice.

And the proposition that Innovatio appears to be making in its brief, namely, that because the Court held that their patents were standard-essential, there were no -- therefore, there can be no commercially and technically feasible non-infringing alternative, I think is just an incorrect proposition.

So, in short, the correct inquiry looks *ex ante* at whether or not there were alternatives available to the standards-making authority, and the evidence will show here that there were substantial and meaningful and commercially and technically feasible alternatives.

That completes my remarks. Thank you, Your Honor.

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1 THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much. 2 All right. Any further comments by way of opening 3 statement? 4 MR. McANDREWS: No. I think Mr. Cherny covered an awful lot of ground, Your Honor. I think some of the 5 6 statements, in Innovatio's view, were taken a bit out of 7 context. We will meet that with a robust rebuttal through 8 witness testimony and then, of course, during closing. 9 THE COURT: Yeah. Now you know the roadmap. 10 Unfortunately, there's no rebuttal argument to opening 11 statements. 12 MR. McANDREWS: Right. 13 THE COURT: But I, of course, haven't heard any 14 evidence from the witness stand yet, and we're ready to proceed 15 with that. 16 MR. CHERNY: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. If you want to call your 18 first witness out of order, we'll see if we can get him on and 19 off the witness stand by his witching hour of 1:00 o'clock. 20 MR. ALPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 We call David Djavaherian. 22 THE COURT: Raise your right hand. 23 (Witness duly sworn.) 24 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25

112 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 THE COURT: Direct examination. You may proceed. 2 MR. ALPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 DAVID DJAVAHERIAN, DEFENDANTS' WITNESS, SWORN 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ALPER: 5 6 Will you please introduce yourself. 7 Α. Yes. My name is Dave Djavaherian. Where are you currently employed, Mr. Djavaherian? 8 Q. 9 THE COURT: We will just make sure we got the correct 10 spelling. It was spelled by your counsel, and I am sure she 11 spelled it correctly, but let's just make sure. 12 THE WITNESS: Sure. For the record, it's D, as in 13 David, i-a-v, as in Victor, a-h-e-r-i-a-n. 14 THE COURT: And you pronounce it again? 15 THE WITNESS: Djavaherian. 16 THE COURT: Djavaherian. 17 BY MR. ALPER: 18 Mr. Djavaherian, where are you currently employed? 19 Α. Broadcom Corporation. 20 How long have you been employed at Broadcom? Q. 21 Α. Just over three years. 22 Could you please go briefly through your employment history 23 prior to joining Broadcom. 24 A. Sure. I came out of law school and went to a law firm 25 named Irell & Manella and was a litigator there, practiced IP

Case: 1:11-cv-09308 Document #: 990 Filed: 11/01/13 Page 113 of 165 PageID #:42796 113 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 litigation, did some transactional work. 2 In about 2007, I joined a semiconductor company in 3 the bay area, was there for about three years, and then in 2010, I joined Broadcom. 4 5 **Q**. And where did you go to law school? 6 MS. TESSAR: I'm sorry to interrupt. But I just 7 wanted to interject, because I think there have been a lot of 8 people in and out of the courtroom, and there may be someone 9 here from Qualcomm who's not a party. And so I want to make 10 sure on the record that we're clear that this testimony is 11 sealed and that only outside counsel for the parties, in-house 12 counsel for the parties and other people authorized under the 13 protective order are permitted in the courtroom now. 14 THE COURT: All right. Well, when we get to those 15 parts -- his background and experience, it seems to me, to be 16 something that can be available to the public. When we get to 17 those parts, why don't you point it out. 18 MS. TESSAR: Perfect. 19 THE COURT: And, Mr. Alper, maybe you've segregated 20 those parts in your testimony as well. 21 MR. ALPER: I have, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: I hesitate to put an entire witness' 23 testimony under seal.


had said earlier to have everybody out. Sorry for the

MS. TESSAR: Absolutely agreed. I just thought you

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114 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 interruption. 2 THE COURT: Well, if you want to scan the room to see 3 if -- who would be the objectionable people? 4 MS. TESSAR: Anyone who's not under the protective 5 order. Someone just passed me a note saying there was someone from Qualcomm here, but I don't know who it is. 6 7 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You did what now? MS. TESSAR: Someone passed me a note saying there's 8 9 someone from Qualcomm here, but I don't know who it is. 10 THE COURT: Is there anyone here from Qualcomm? 11 Anyone in the courtroom? You're now ordered to raise your hand 12 if you're Qualcomm on pain of contempt. 13 MS. TESSAR: So it should be that everyone in the 14 room would be under the protective order, then. Thank you. 15 THE COURT: No one has raised their hand. 16 Let me just say anyone who remains in the courtroom 17 for the remainder of this testimony will be held to be under 18 the protective order that was entered in this case with regard 19 to parties and counsel. 20 All right. Someone has left the courtroom now 21 voluntarily without identifying himself, and we'll proceed with 22 further testimony. 23 We'll consider this -- just for purposes of moving 24 through it efficiently, we'll consider it under seal. And if 25 there's a request for public disclosure beyond counsel of

115 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 record, which includes counsel for Broadcom, then you'll have 2 to make a motion before me and we'll address it on notice. 3 0kay? Thank you, Your Honor. 4 MR. ALPER: 5 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 6 So you joined Broadcom in 2010? 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 8 THE COURT: What month? 9 THE WITNESS: I believe it was July or August. 10 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 11 MR. ALPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 13 BY MR. ALPER: 14 Mr. Diavaherian, where did you go to law school? 15 I went to the University of California at Berkeley. Α. 16 Q. Let's talk about Broadcom and your work at Broadcom. 17 What are your responsibilities there? 18 A. So I have a variety of responsibilities. I'm in the legal 19 department. I'm an attorney. I handle various litigation and 20 licensing-related issues and negotiations. I handle various IP 21 matters. 22 Recently, I've been spending a lot of time handling 23 IP policy matters relating to standards-setting organizations 24 and acting as Broadcom's delegate to some of the organizations 25 that are dealing with RAND issues.



117 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 relating to cellular communications technology, such as LTE or 2 3G and various other technologies, and flying out there tonight 3 to make the meeting for tomorrow. And then after that, there's a meeting in Geneva with 4 the International Telecommunications Union, which is a 5 subsidiary of the UN, where we're also going to be debating 6 7 standards policy for standards that the ITU oversees. 8 Q. 9 10 11 Α. 12 Q. 13 Α. 14 Q. Well, I'm going to turn back to that in a moment, 15 but before that, I'd like to ask you a little bit about 16 Broadcom's business and Broadcom's products. 17 So let me begin by asking you, what is Broadcom's 18 business? 19 A. So Broadcom is a semiconductor company. We specialize in 20 communications semiconductors, so anything from 802.11, as 21 we've been discussing today, to Bluetooth to NFC technologies. 22 We're involved in Ethernet communications, involved in various 23 infrastructure-type technologies, like switches, cable set-top

boxes, and the sort of -- the communications technologies that

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25

are involved there.

Case: 1:11-cv-09308 Document #: 990 Filed: 11/01/13 Page 118 of 165 PageID #:42801 118 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 So basically, you know, our motto is connecting 2 everything, and basically we play in a variety of markets, all 3 involving computers or electronic devices talking to each other 4 and communicating with each other, and that's why it's communications semiconductors. 5 Does Broadcom sell 802.11 products? 6 7 Α. Yes. Q. And when we talk about 802.11, your -- that's the 802.11 8 9 standard. You have familiarity with that? 10 A. Yes, I do. 11 Okay. And what are the types of products that Broadcom 12 sells that have 802.11 functionality? 13 A. So, as I said, Broadcom's a semiconductor company, meaning 14 we sell chips, so we design and market and sell semiconductor 15 chips to customers who then, you know, put them into various, 16 you know, devices that then sell them to the public. 17 Q. When it comes to 802.11 products, where does the 18 functionality that is described in the 802.11 standards go? 19 MR. SCHARFF: Objection, Your Honor, lack of 20 foundation. He's an attorney for Broadcom, not a technical, you know, engineer. 21 22 THE COURT: Response? 23 MR. ALPER: I can establish some foundation, Your


24 Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Please do.

Djavaherian - direct by Alper 119


- 1 BY MR. ALPER:
- 2 **Q.** Are you familiar with Broadcom's 802.11 chip products?
- 3 A. Yes, generally.
- 4 Q. And are you familiar with -- you attend standards-setting
- 5 organization meetings relating to 802.11 standard -- or
- 6 relating to IPR policies for the standards?
- 7 A. Yeah. I've attended meetings for various organizations,
- 8 and IEEE, which sets the 802.11 standard, has been recently
- 9 involved in reviewing and revising its IPR policy.
- 10 **Q**. And you have experience with licensing the 802.11 chips?
- 11 A. Licensing negotiations and participating in those, yes.
- 12 Q. And in the course of that experience, have you become
- familiar with the technologies relating to 802.11 and
- 14 Broadcom's products?
- 15 A. Yes, I mean, to a degree. I'm not an engineer, but
- 16 certainly to the degree that I need to.
- 17 Q. And what is your understanding of where the 802.11
- 18 standards can be found with respect to 802.11 products?
- MR. SCHARFF: Your Honor, we're going to maintain our
- 20 objection.
- 21 THE COURT: Okay.
- 22 MR. SCHARFF: We believe that the foundation and his
- understanding in standards doesn't give him adequate
- 24 qualification to talk about functionality in a chip.
- 25 THE COURT: All right. I am going to take your




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
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



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





129 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 courtroom that you believe should be excluded? Any party? Is 2 there anyone that any party believes should be excluded? 3 And if you want to ask people you don't personally know who they are and what they're doing, you certainly may. 4 5 MS. TESSAR: I think as long as everyone who's here 6 by remaining seated commits that they are outside counsel to 7 the parties or in-house counsel and allowed under the 8 protective order. 9 THE COURT: All right. Like a RAND obligation, you 10 folks are now required to maintain the confidentiality. And if 11 you don't desire to do that, please step out of the courtroom. 12 All right. One individual has left the courtroom. 13 Another individual went back and talked to someone, but -- all 14 Everyone else now is bound to the confidentiality 15 agreement. And if it is later shown that you have violated 16 that agreement, there is a possibility you could be held in 17 contempt. You are ordered to now maintain that 18 confidentiality. 19 MS. TESSAR: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. Okay. You may proceed. 21 MR. ALPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 BY MR. ALPER: 23 Q. 24 25

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                       Djavaherian - direct by Alper
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 2
 3
      Q. Okay.
 4
 5
                MR. SCHARFF: I'd just like to ask how long, counsel,
      you think you are keep going? I just want to make sure I have
 6
 7
      enough time to cross.
                MR. ALPER: Sure. Let's see. How about another ten
 8
 9
      minutes or less?
                MR. SCHARFF: I was actually anticipating --
10
11
                THE COURT: What time is your actual witching hour?
12
                THE WITNESS: So my flight is on Lufthansa at 3:45.
13
                THE COURT: At 0'Hare?
14
                THE WITNESS: At O'Hare. So I need to be there --
15
      it's an international flight. So an hour, hour and a half
16
      ahead of time. So I probably can go a little past 1:00. I
17
      don't know what traffic is like.
18
                THE COURT: Midday on a Monday, good weather, not
19
      sure.
20
           (Laughter.)
21
                THE COURT: All right. Well, let's see if we can get
22
      it done.
23
                MR. SCHARFF: Your Honor --
24
                THE WITNESS: I appreciate the Court's efforts in
25
      trying to get me off.
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Djavaherian - direct by Alper 14		Djavaherian	-	direct	by	Alper	142
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A. Yes.

- 2 Q. I'm going to show you what we've marked as DTX 668, and
- 3 I'll stay zoomed out for just a moment so you can see the whole
- 4 thing, and --
- 5 THE COURT: Just as we did with the prior exhibit,
- 6 unless there is an objection, it will be considered un -- that
- 7 there is no objection, and we'll proceed with it being admitted
- 8 in evidence.
- 9 MR. SCHARFF: There's no objection, Your Honor.
- 10 THE COURT: You may proceed. So we'll just --
- 11 silence is confirmation that it's admissible. You may proceed.
- MR. ALPER: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 13 BY MR. ALPER:
- 14 Q. What is Exhibit 668?
- 15 A. So this is a submission that Broadcom made in 2011 to the
- 16 FTC in response to an FTC request for comments on patents
- 17 standards issues.
- 18 Q. Okay. And so Broadcom made this submission in response to
- 19 the Federal Trade Commission's request for positions on IP
- 20 licensing and RAND and so forth?
- 21 A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you a few questions about a couple
- of pieces of this and then we'll finish up.
- So one sentence down here that I want to draw your
- 25 attention to says: "In summary, Broadcom believes that many

Djavaherian - direct by Alper

companies that have invented the technology incorporated into standards continue to feel the effects of patent holdup directly."

And it goes on to say: "Just as important, patent holdup means higher prices and fewer choices for the many millions of consumers of standards-based products."

And then you go into a section that says Patent Holdup is a Real Concern. And my question for you is, why is patent holdup a real concern for Broadcom?

A. So Broadcom, as I was saying earlier, participates in lots of markets and is involved in the sale of lots of chips that are subject to all sorts of different standards bodies.

We have seen, I think, a proliferation of patent litigation directed, you know, both at our company as well as our customers, and we've seen a proliferation of claims by patentholders seeking very high royalties or seeking injunctions as a way to get very high royalties. And so, just in general, I think that as a producer in the market with the -- with sort of the economics that I was referring to earlier, in terms of profit margins and such, you know, we think standards need to be, you know, respected and that the RAND commitment needs to be respected, and it's a threat to sort of our business and our ability to invest in R&D and our ability to sell our products at a fair price when, you know, we have multiple patent assertions by multiple entities all

Case: 1:11-cv-09308 Document #: 990 Filed: 11/01/13 Page 144 of 165 PageID #:42827 144 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 seeking very, very high rates that, in our view, don't comply 2 with RAND. 3 Is Broadcom concerned that if RAND royalties are too low, 4 companies will be disincentivized to invest in the research and 5 development of standardized technologies? 6 A. So, you know, RAND means reasonable, and setting that rate 7 is an effort to figure out what a reasonable and 8 non-discriminatory rate is. We think that if the proper RAND 9 principles are applied, principles involving, you know, 10 proportionality and principles involving royalty stacking and 11 avoiding some of those concerns that have been expressed in 12 academic literature and by the administrative agencies and by 13 the anti-trust authorities, that a RAND rate, you know, won't 14 be too low and that the standard will be allowed to prosper. 15 I don't think we've been focused on concerns that 16 RAND rates are being set at a number that's too low. I think 17 we've seen the opposite problem. 18 I'm going to direct you to another piece of this 19 submission to the FTC, and here on page 3 --20 THE COURT: Same exhibit, DTX 668? 21 MR. ALPER: Yes, 668. 22 BY MR. ALPER: 23

Q. On page 3, Broadcom says: "Finally, in 2003, CSIRO initiated a licensing campaign in which, if adopted by every patentholder that had provided a RAND assurance, would have

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added more than \$100 to each WLAN product."

Can you explain to us the principles that are being addressed in that sentence?

- A. So this sentence relates to the issue that I referred to a moment ago of royalty stacking. So, you know, the concern is that if you don't take into account the whole gambit of patents that may potentially apply to a particular standard, in setting the rate of any patent within that standard, you can end up with a situation where the aggregate royalty stack is much, much higher than would seem to be reasonable and much, much higher than would be required for the standard to be successful and to allow companies to invest in, you know, exploitation of the standard.
- **Q**. All right. And lastly -- well, actually, let me ask you this. Is royalty stacking a theoretical concern to Broadcom?
 - A. It's both theoretical and practical, I guess. I mean, I think that royalty stacking is both something that we have, you know, seen talked about in academic literature and by the agencies. It's also something that we've seen, you know, sort of in practice, for instance, in 802.11 where, you know, you've got -- we've seen multiple non-practicing entities -- you know, like CSIRO was mentioned earlier in this document. There's a company called WiLAN that's been going after 802.11. Mosaid has been going after 802.11. There are various operating

companies that are not in the 802.11 space, that are in

146 Djavaherian - direct by Alper 1 different spaces that have tried to apply some of their patents 2 and seek very high royalties in connection with 802.11. 3 There's a patent pool that's being developed, called 4 Via licensing, that relates to 802.11. So there -- you know, 5 beyond that, there are -- you know, again, we see a lot of 6 this, not just via direction assertions against Broadcom, but 7 via assertions against our customers, and, you know, there are, 8 you know, easily more than ten and maybe dozens of other 9 assertions that we've seen in the Wi-Fi space directed to 10 802.11. 11 **Q.** Okay. I'm going to lastly direct you to one other area of 12 this. And I'm not going to get into the details here, but I'm 13 just going to focus on one -- two words at the beginning of section ex ante and ask you this question. 14 15 THE COURT: What page is that again? 16 MR. ALPER: I'm sorry. This is page 4 of Exhibit 17 668. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. 19 BY MR. ALPER: 20 **Q**. Section B talks about -- uses the word *ex ante*, and my 21 question for you, Mr. Djavaherian, is what does ex ante mean in 22 connection with RAND licensing? 23 MR. SCHARFF: Objection to the extent it calls for an 24 expert conclusion.

THE COURT: Well, I will take his understanding,

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Djavaherian - direct by Alper

1 provide his understanding, and I will consider your objection.

BY THE WITNESS:

A. So ex ante is a principle that we've talked about a lot in these SSO meetings that I've been going to and that's addressed in, you know, a lot of the literature, you know, regarding RAND, and that I've used in sort of -- in those contexts and in sort of Broadcom's submissions regarding RAND licensing.


The idea, basically, is you can't -- in determining RAND or a RAND rate, you can't include value that's attributable to the fact of standardization. So you need to look, when you're assessing a RAND royalty, at the inherent value of the technology as compared to other alternatives that would be available to, you know, implement a similar or -- you know, I don't want to say the same standard because it would be written slightly different, but implement that same idea of a standard. So 802.11 with a slight tweak to accommodate one approach rather than another.

And the reason for that is, you know, once you have a standard set -- you know, before standard setting, you have lots of options, you have lots of ways to do things, and once you have a standard set, you have a lock-in, and that allows for a degree of leverage that has been referred to as, you know, holdup leverage or other things that can be exploited to seek royalty rates that are much higher than RAND.

MR. ALPER: All right. Thank you very much,

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1 Mr. Djavaherian. No further questions. 2 THE COURT: All right. Cross-examination. 3 MR. SCHARFF: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: While counsel is coming up, was Professor 4 5 Lemley at Berkeley when you were there? THE WITNESS: He got there shortly -- like I think a 6 7 year after I left, but I had worked with Professor Lemley. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 THE WITNESS: He sends me all his articles that he 10 writes in a little care package every once in a while. 11 THE COURT: You have read the article where he says there should be some means to evaluate the RAND rate through 12 13 arbitration, similar to baseball arbitration? 14 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I mean, he -- Mark Lemley is a 15 very prolific writer. 16 THE COURT: Yes, he is. 17 THE WITNESS: So I don't know that I can recall that 18 specific article, but --19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 THE WITNESS: But there have been lots of, you know, 21 proposals. For arbitration, in particular, the focus has been 22 on voluntary arbitration as opposed to any sort of mandatory 23 approach, but certainly I think there are lots of approaches 24 that might be better than what we are currently doing to set 25 RAND rates.



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1	CERTIFICATE
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5	I, Colleen M. Conway, do hereby certify that the
6	foregoing is a complete, true, and accurate transcript of the
7	Trial proceedings, Volume 1, Pages 1-164, had in the
8	above-entitled case before the HONORABLE JAMES F. HOLDERMAN,
9	one of the Judges of said Court, at Chicago, Illinois, on
10	September 9, 2013.
11	
12	
13	/s/ Colleen M. Conway, CSR, RMR, CRR 09/09/13
14	Official Court Reporter Date United States District Court
15	Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division
16	Lascotti Bivision
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